

## 4<sup>TH</sup> RISK **ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP**

Report No. 2009/07

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#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND CITATIONS

The IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme supports and operates a number of international research networks. This report presents the results of a workshop held by one of these international research networks. The report was prepared by the IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme as a record of the events of that workshop.

The fourth international research network on Risk Assessment was organised by IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme in co-operation with the CO2CRC. The organisers acknowledge the hospitality provided by the hosts Rendezvous Hotel, Melbourne, Australia.

A steering committee has been formed to guide the direction of this network. The steering committee members for this network are:

Tim Dixon, IEA GHG (Chairman) John Kaldi, CO2CRC Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta / IPAC Jonathan Pearce, British Geological Survey Malcolm Wilson, University of Regina / IPAC Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger Lisa Bacanskas, US EPA George Guthrie, NETL Charles Jenkins, CO2CRC Brendan Beck, IEA GHG

The report should be cited in literature as follows:

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Further information on the network activities or copies of the report can be obtained by contacting the IEA GHG Programme at:

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## Summary Report of 4<sup>th</sup> Risk Assessment Network Meeting

Date: 16 – 18 April 2009 Rendezvous Hotel, Melbourne, Australia.

Organised by IEA GHG and CO2CRC.





#### FOURTH WORKSHOP OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH NETWORK ON RISK ASSESSMENT

#### **Executive Summary**

The fourth IEA GHG Risk Assessment Network Meeting was held on the 16th—17th April 2009 in Melbourne, Australia, and hosted by CO2CRC.

Cliff Kavonic of Victorian Department of Primary Industries gave the official welcome. The Victorian Government was that day publishing a report by Geoscience Victoria on the storage potential in the Gippsland basin in south Victoria.

The fifty six attendees enjoyed the discussions based around the six sessions. These were on reports from other initiatives, leakage impacts, combining monitoring with modelling and risk assessment, insurance and risk, risk communication, and updates from real projects.

Of particular note were Australian presentations on impacts of  $CO_2$  storage on groundwater, putting potential effects of  $CO_2$  into context with other effects, and showing that there may be positive effects in terms of drinking water re-pressurisation. Work from the US and Canada was also heard on groundwater impacts.

Also, in terms of risk communication, the community engagement for two successful projects in Germany and Australia were presented, highlighting the importance of the engagement process itself as much as the information communicated.

The workshop also included a presentation and discussion of risk assessment and insurance. This included discussion of the CCS liability policies offered by Zurich Insurance, and the role of ETS in setting a price for  $CO_2$ . This is discussed in more detail in Session 4 of this report.

The workshop concluded with breakout groups to identify the gaps, recommended actions, and key learning points. In considering the future role of the Risk Assessment Network, the overall conclusion was that it continues to be necessary, but level of openness in the future may not be a great as members' desire because of increasing commercial sensitivities around real projects. In terms of what are the boundaries of the Risk Assessment Network's mission – the conclusions from most participants were that it should remain technically focused, although its results are use in the context of economic, political, social and other risks assessments.

The meeting was followed by a trip to the CO2CRC Otway project to see first-hand the site and work that had been described during the Network meeting.



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### Welcome and Introduction,

Tim Dixon and John Kaldi opened the meeting, and reminded all of the remit of the Network which was established in 2005.

Cliff Kavonic of Victorian Department of Primary Industries gave the official welcome. The Victorian Government, coincidentally, that day released a report by Geoscience Victoria on the storage potential in the Gippsland basin in south Victoria. Questions followed around funding for CCS, the role of CCS within emissions trading schemes, and CCS and biomass. Cliff and Tim Dixon responded.

Neil Wildgust of IEA GHG gave a presentation on the results of the previous Risk Assessment Network meeting and the relevant conclusions from the Joint Network meeting.

### Session 1: Reports from Other Initiatives, Chair: Malcolm Wilson

#### 1.1 Modelling Network; Neil Wildgust, IEA GHG

Neil Wildgust of IEA GHG gave a presentation on the first meeting of the new IEA GHG network on modelling of  $CO_2$  storage, held in Orleans, France, Feb. 10-13. Part of the aims of that meeting was to identify technical knowledge gaps and provide an international forum to try to identify means to address those gaps. Questions followed on whether this network had considered how it would interface with the risk assessment process. This had been discussed but without reaching a conclusion. It was suggested that each network should have its own risk assessment.

#### 1.2 Wellbore Integrity Network; Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta

Rick Chalaturnyk of the University of Alberta gave a presentation on the results of the last Well Integrity Network (WIN) meeting. This included reviews of experiments on Portland based cements. The WIN identified the need to evaluate  $CO_2$  resistant cements and to get information on frequency of failure of oil and gas wells and  $CO_2$  EOR wells, in order to model leakage rates, so as to input to risk assessment. The network is working towards a risk based assessment of wellbores. Questions followed on whether it was possible to measure  $CO_2$  flux in wellbores.

#### 1.3 IPAC; Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta

Rick Chalaturnyk of the University of Alberta gave a presentation on the International Performance Assessment Centre (IPAC). IPAC is proposed as an international independent evaluating body benchmarking risk technologies. It is to be based in Regina, but to have nodes & "networked" stakeholders elsewhere in the world. Comments included that IPAC may only be needed if existing risk assessments were not sufficient; that it had to do assessments with transparent indicators, including frequency and severity and type of loss. Rick responded that IPAC would not take-on liability if its assurance was wrong, as it won't review risk quantification but only risk assessment procedures.



#### 1.4 Risk Assessment Terminology Study; Anna Korre, Imperial College

Anna Korre gave a talk on the IEA GHG funded study on Risk Assessment Terminology. This focussed more on the risk processes than the definitions. This draft report has been peer reviewed. Further comments are welcomed by IEA GHG and IPAC will input to this report and adopt and share. The need for a standard definition of risk assessment was raised.

#### 1.5 CSLF Risk Assessment Taskforce; Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger

Claudia Vivalda gave a brief overview of the work of the CSLF's Risk Assessment Taskforce and its forthcoming report on an overview of risk assessment for CCS (to be finalised May, 2009). Their recent meeting in Oslo this month had recognised the need of undertaking a gap assessment on tools and methodologies to be encouraged by PIRT, and recommended to the CSLF Policy Group to consider the link between risk assessment and liability and to put the use of risk assessment in the context of stakeholder outreach and communication.

#### **1.6 Facilitated Discussion Session 1**

The discussion was around whether additional "general guidelines" were needed, suggesting there was more impetus for specific case-by-case guidelines rather than more general ones. IPAC are looking at this.



### Session 2: Quantification of Leakage Impacts, Chair: Claudia Vivalda

#### 2.1 Environmental Impacts Workshop; Jonathan Pearce, BGS

Jonathan Pearce of BGS gave a presentation on the outcomes from the IEA GHG workshop on Environmental Impacts of Leakage (EIL), with its recommendations including research needs. Specifically, there is a need for credible (post injection) leakage scenarios (how much/how long) so as to define scope of environmental impact assessments and to put leakage into context and scope the scale of experimental releases and how these might impact modelling. The workshop also considered industry needs, regulator needs and public awareness needs. Studies on analogues are recommended, and work on target indicator species. Questions followed on experiments on injecting  $CO_2$  into groundwater, though this wasn't included at the EIL workshop. Ensuing discussion included agreement that we must engage the public, but what is communicated must match level of audience understanding; i.e. be aware of terminology and of how much of our uncertainty to discuss.

## 2.2 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective I; Jim Underschultz, CO2CRC / CSIRO

Jim Underschultz of CSIRO/CO2CRC gave a presentation on their work in Australia on impacts of  $CO_2$  storage on groundwater in the Gippsland basin. This was in terms of the effects on the freshwater/brine boundaries moving and flux through cap rocks. The freshwater/brine boundary movement has to be looked at in the context of significant movements caused by mine dewatering, oil and gas extraction, water extraction for irrigation and the natural flows that exist going to offshore.

#### 2.3 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective II; Greg Leamon & Andrew Feitz, Geoscience Australia

Greg Leamon and Andrew Feitz gave a presentation on Geoscience Australia's work on groundwater impacts. Greg described their assistance to the Commonwealth Government with the offshore acreage releases. Andrew talked about their work in the Great Artesian Basin (Queensland) looking at potential impacts in the Surat / Gallilee Basins. This region has 3,100 artesian wells deeper than 1,000m and 35,000 sub-artesian wells around 100m deep. This extraction has caused the water level to drop by 100m, and more pumping required at existing wells. Methane also exists in the water and degassing causes a risk as well as being a GHG. The main risk of  $CO_2$  storage in this region is of contaminating the freshwater and of leakage of the  $CO_2$ . However, on the positive side, it could also boost the pressure in the depleted water reservoirs and so assist freshwater extraction. There are no proposals at present to use the Great Artesian Basin for  $CO_2$  storage. Questions included the potential conflict in permitting different resources.



#### 2.4 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: Weyburn Perspective; Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta

Rick Chalaturnyk of the University of Alberta gave a talk on the Weyburn project's work on potential geochemical impacts on shallow potable water, looking at wellbore leakage scenarios. The in situ geochemistry was sampled and tested with  $CO_2$  in laboratories. The results suggest that formation of precipitates could actually have a leakage plugging effect, and that a drop in pH was caused which itself caused other geochemical changes but not at levels that would affect drinking water. Questions followed on the precipitates formed (siderite vs. iron oxide), site specific behaviour, and equilibrium in laboratory tests compared to in situ.

#### 2.5 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: A US Perspective; Lisa Bacanskas, US EPA

Lisa Bacanskas of the US EPA gave the US perspective, reporting out on work lead by Jens Birkholzer (LBNL) on the potential impacts of  $CO_2$  leakage on groundwater. The talk focused on research that investigated water quality changes that resulted from increased acidification, for example contaminants released from mineral sources within the shallow aquifer (release either from dissolution of minerals such as galena, a lead sulfide; from desorption, or from ion exchange sites). Results from the ZERT work were shown. Questions followed on how long the baseline data had been gathered and that rainfall was the main driver of baseline data.

#### 2.6 Facilitated Discussion Session 2

Extensive discussion followed. Experimental data is used to build models, but models should be built first then tested with real results, this would provide more learning. In terms of well leakage, what are credible leakage scenarios for 1,000 years when no-one may be around? It was suggested that model well bores as just open to create worst case scenario. On well plugging, currently this is done to EOR standards which may not be enough for  $CO_2$ . BRGM are working on a simulation of  $CO_2$  leakage into the Paris basin aquifer, but no results available yet.

Is model software development sufficient? It was suggested that reservoir simulators should have geochemistry added. Geomechanical effects are more for short-term, but geochemical effects are longer-term except for effects on injectivity.

From the insurance perspective, models are missing effects on groundwater. The risk assessment should happen by operational stages to reflect available tenure. Whilst there isn't the case history for actuaries to have data to build on, there are insurance-analogues to work from and other new activities don't have such data and are able to be insured.



### Session 3: Combining MMV, Modelling and Risk Assessment, Chair: Rick Chalaturnyk

#### 3.1 US Regional Partnerships; Ken Knottavange-Telleen, Schlumberger / MGSC

Ken Knottavange-Telleen of Schlumberger US gave a presentation on the work of the US regional partnerships in general and the Midwest Geological Storage Consortium in particular (MGSC) with their Decatur Project in Illinois. This used Features Events & Processes (FEP)-based risk matrix approach. Most discussion to date has been how to bring quantification to the risk assessment, and Schlumberger's work has brought risk assessment to modelling. Discussion on this approach suggested that it doesn't calculate probability of events, but is semi-quantitative in nature. It provides information to project managers for prioritisation of resources. The FEPs were looked at in isolation and weren't aggregated.

#### **3.2** Combining MMV, Modelling and Risk Assessment at the Otway Project; Charles Jenkins, CO2CRC

Charles Jenkins of CO2CRC gave an extensive presentation on combining MMV, modelling and risk assessment at the Otway project. This covered the range of monitoring techniques, verification of predicted behaviour and development of key performance indicators. This work generates many research questions, such as what to measure, how sensitive, spatial and temporal coverage, how to interpret measurements. Questions were on whether the risk assessment drove the monitoring selection. The modelling to predict breakthrough used full deterministic modelling, and the actual breakthrough to the monitoring well was at the early end (just over 4 months) of the range predicted (4-8 months).

#### **3.3** The TESLA Risk Assessment Tool and System Modelling; Richard Metcalfe, Quintessa

Richard Metcalfe of Quintessa gave a presentation on the TESLA risk assessment tool and system modelling. This provides whole system modelling and is a decision support tool driven by uncertainties based on value judgements by humans. Simon James of Shell (India) gave a presentation of Shell's experience in using the TESLA methodology. They have used this several times now on different projects. Their learning's were that it compliments other risk assessment methodologies. Its main benefit is in highlighting areas of insufficient evidence and where evidence is conflicting. Questions covered how the value of this approach was in the discussions it prompted between experts rather than the numbers coming out. A point was made that expert opinions still rely on experts, who are subject to human values. Benefit came from testing the results from one group of experts on another group of experts. It also creates benefit in getting focus on the evidence base.

#### 3.4 Facilitated Discussion Session 3

The discussion that followed continued the themes in the questions on TESLA. Such an approach has its main benefits in assisting resource decisions and not in risk quantification. Consideration was given to group dynamics in terms of consensus views versus individual views, and the benefits therein of bring in external experts from outside project teams.



### Session 4: Insurance and Risk Assessment, Chair: Jonathan Pearce

#### 4.1 Setting the Scene; Lindene Patton, Zurich

A panel session was held on insurance and risk assessment. Lindene Patton of Zurich (USA) gave the scene setting presentation, and the panel consisted of Lindene, Andy Nicol of GNS New Zealand, and Simon James of Shell. Lindene highlighted the principles of public good and private asset protection and risk profile of CCS projects (increasing with time) that underlie the CCS liability policy provided by Zurich. This policy includes risks of pollution (air and groundwater etc), business interruption, well integrity and geomechanical liability. Simon focussed on the need for enough information to make business decisions. For them risk assessment includes technical, economic, commercial, organisational and political risks. Ways of managing risks are demonstrated in their proposed CDM methodology. Andy raised questions on the interface between insurance and technical risk assessment which is mostly qualitative and dominated by judgements of experts with the primary focus being on containment. He thought that economic, political and social risks should be dealt with separately. To prompt discussion he asked: what range of activities should be included; should economics be integrated; what risk metrics should be used (e.g. dollars, human safety); how to value consequences and estimate uncertainty.

#### 4.2 Panel Discussion

The discussion started with the price on  $CO_2$  and the role of ETS in providing that. The question of "Who are 'We' in the Risk Assessment Network was asked, seeking definition of the group whose participants include technologists, regulators and project developers. The insurance industry thought that there was a reluctance to deal with the conflicts of resources issue, which is controlled by regulatory bodies. There was acknowledgement that the Risk Assessment Network was technology orientated. It was also highlighted that transport networks would be required as companies moved from single-source-sink to a portfolio approach of multiple hubs, including other mitigation options.

Consideration was given to mitigation of deep leaks or migration. However, it was although thought that the system failing in such a way would trigger regulatory action, and that this group's focus was primarily driver by regulatory requirements and frameworks. There was celebration that this group included regulators as well as technologists and project developers. There was also a question whether the group should broaden from risk assessment to risk management, without conclusion in the discussion.



### Session 5: Risk Communication, Chair: Tim Dixon

#### 5.1 Risk Communication; Peta Ashworth, CSIRO

Peta Ashworth of CSIRO (Australia) gave a scene setting talk on risk communication in the context of public communication and consultation around CCS. She covered both theory and real-life practice and results from Australia and world-wide, including the work of the US Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships around their CCS projects. Essential elements in project's consultation with the public are to build trust, understand perceptions and moral acceptability, and ensure the benefits outweigh the risks.

#### 5.2 Communication and Public Perception for the Otway Project; Sandeep Sharma, CO2CRC

Sandeep Sharma of CO2CRC (Australia) gave a presentation on the communication and public perception around the Otway project. One of the project's goals is to build public support for CCS. They created a local Stakeholder Reference Group which meets regularly. He emphasised that you need the local community to make projects happen. Key principles are: for the public to hear from the project directly and not via the media; address concerns quickly; use scientists to communicate; if can't provide data then explain why; start early; and involve government staff.

#### 5.3 Risk Communication – A Government Perspective; Namiko Ranasinghe, Victorian State Government

Namiko Ranasinghe of Victoria Department of Primary Industries gave a talk from a government perspective, including the overlapping regulatory regimes for Otway. She got audience participation in a risk rating exercise. Frank Schilling of University of Karlsruhe (KIT) (Germany) gave a presentation on the public engagement in the  $CO_2Sink$  project at Ketzin. He emphasised their success was down to establishing trust, honesty and providing a good and direct point of contact.

#### 5.4 Facilitated Discussion Session 5

The discussion considered the results from these and other projects, and the importance of the right terminology, e.g. "catastrophic" should be used with caution. A key conclusion was drawn that these examples of successful projects in public communication were successful essentially because of their process of communication and not just because of the actual risk answers that were provided.



### Session 6: Updates from Real Projects, Chair: John Kaldi

#### 6.1 CO<sub>2</sub>Sink; Frank Schilling, GFZ-Potsdam

Frank Schilling of the University of Karlsruhe (KIT) gave an update on the  $CO_2Sink$  project at Ketzin. This has injected 12k t of  $CO_2$  to date. He described the extensive regulatory approvals process, and that they will reapply for approvals when they get to 20k t  $CO_2$  injected.

#### 6.2 Vattenfall German Demonstration; Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger

Claudia Vivalda of Schlumberger (France) gave an update on the Vattenfall demonstration project at Janschwald. The preliminary risk assessment used DNV's draft guidelines for site qualification. Storage is intended to start in 2014/2015, both storage options are onshore. DNV used Structured What If (SWIFT) workshops to identify hazards and evaluate the risks in a qualitative way, and a Screening and Ranking Framework (SFR) to assess containment integrity.

As the results from these exercises were confidential, this prompted a discussion about whether confidentiality was going to get in the way of future discussions in the Risk Assessment Network.

#### 6.3 Weyburn; Adrian Bowden, URS

Adrian Bowden of URS gave an update on the risk assessment work at Weyburn. This work uses the RISQUE method developed under GEODISC, and is being extended from the technical risk around the reservoir/geological aspects to include environmental and stakeholder risks.

#### 6.4 The Otway Project; Lincoln Paterson, CO2CRC

Lincoln Patterson of CO2CRC gave an update on the Otway project. This started injecting in April 2008 and has injected 46kt  $CO_2$  to date. Stage 2 injection will look at non-structural (e.g. residual) trapping in the saline aquifer Paaratte formation using a second injection well.

#### 6.5 Facilitated Discussion Session 6

Discussion continued about whether confidentiality issues are going to impede future network meetings. It seems there is no way of avoiding it as projects become more commercial, even though it might cause the public to get suspicious. There is also the question of timing, i.e. when to release information, e.g. after, rather than before, a problem is solved?



### Session 7: Key Outcomes and Conclusions

#### 7.1 Key Outcomes

Participants were then divided into three breakout groups to identify outcomes and conclusions from the Risk Assessment Network meeting, in terms of gaps, recommendations for further actions, and key learning's. These are compiled here into one set of outcomes. The individual outputs of each group are provided in Appendix 3.

GAPS:

Projects risk (financial, social, organisational & etc) Data for ACO not poss./access rights Benefit/cost analysis \$ CO2 stored versus project cost Social Charzen (?) Systems approach: e.g.: risk reviews, risk management, optimisation Public policy: need info base? Policy drives risk ID, applying tech RA results to meeting policy goals List of tools, attributes Prioritise gaps per timing Understand phys, chem., coupling Not quant., regulators role, data, calibration of models & validation Evaluation of existing models including procedures Pressure front Brine movement Geostatistics – distribution? How does the risk scale? Understanding EQ rupture in a reservoir EOR - CO2 Induced seismicity, worst case scenarios Consideration of effects on other resources Human error - well operation/included in modelling ERM (enterprise) Biosphere (deep) Mitigation - risk management Induced seismicity Expert elicitation process Acceptability limits Impact assessment & severity

#### TO DO:

Formalise objectives for network Answer "who are we?" Selectively broaden scope & population of R.A.N. & structure Set problem statements, propose mission Rank CCS generic risks that deserve work Define R.A.N. Define our audience Sharing of data Broaden the network? Economists, political risk Biosphere Interaction with stakeholders Non-tech summary/guides Raise public awareness Involvement of wider audience (other disciplines)



Regulator involvement IEA regulator network feedback Co-network meetings Support to international standards IPAC Involvement Explosion Encourage wider participation (discussions) Informal discussions (SPE/ATW forum) Very generalised conclusions

LEARNINGS:

Chat room/blog (restricted access) Produce documents to publish Collect references IPAC Repository for methods & data sets Network must take care describing what it does (i.e.: performance assessment of reservoir etc) Provide info to mitigators & decision makers (sub surface mitigation) Need a formal definition of that the R.A. is for the network Think tank for R.A. IPAC relationship

#### 7.2 Conclusions

It was concluded that this meeting of the Risk Assessment Network had addressed the key topics and technical gaps as recommended by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Risk Assessment Network and the Joint Network meetings. In terms of the rationale, scope and objectives of the network, it was concluded that the Risk Assessment Network continues to be necessary, however recognizing that the level of openness in the future may not be as great as members' desire because of commercial sensitivities. In terms of the scope of the Risk Assessment Network's mission – the conclusions from the majority of participants was that it should remain subsurface i.e. technical, in its focus. The overall objectives for the Network as described at the beginning (and are included in Appendix 4) have been followed well to date, but should these be revisited in the light of this meeting and wider developments, for example regulation did not exist in 2005 and increasingly does now. More time can be devoted to discussion of these overall objectives by including them on the agenda for the next meeting.

Presentations are available on the Risk Assessment Network website:

www.co2captureandstorage.info/networks/riskassess.htm. IPAC offered to host the next Risk Assessment Network workshop.



Day 2 (17th April 2009)			
Session 4: Risk Assessment and Insurance, Chair: Jonathan Pearce			
08.30 to 08.45	Setting the scene; Lindene Patton, Zurich		
08.45 to 10.00	Panel session involving: Lindene Patton, Zurich Andy Nicol, GNS Simon James, Shell		
10.00 to 10.30 Break			
Session 5: Risk Communication, Chair: Tim Dixon			
10.30 to 11.00	Risk Communication: Peta Ashworth, CSIRO		
11.00 to 11.20	Communication and public perception for the Otway project: Sandeep Sharma, CO2CRC		
11.20 to 11.40	Risk Communication - a government perspective: Namiko Ranasinghe, Victorian State Government		
11.40 to 12.30	Discussion		
12.30 to 13.30 Lunch in the Grill Restaurant			
Session 6: Updates from Real Projects, Chair: John Kaldi			
13.30 to 14.00	CO <sub>2</sub> Sink: Frank Schilling, GFZ-Potsdam		
14.00 to 14.30	Vattenfall German Demonstration; Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger		
14.30 to 15.00	Weyburn; Adrian Bowden, URS		
15.00 to 15.30	The Otway Project; Lincoln Paterson, CO2CRC		
15.30 to 16.40	Discussion		
16.40 to 17.00 Break			
17.00 to 17.30	Key learning for other networks and summing-up including topics for next meeting; Tim Dixon, IEA GHG, John Kaldi, CO2CRC		
Close Day 2			



### **Appendix 1: Original Network Objectives**

The objectives of the Risk Assessment as set out in 2005:

- Overall aim: To bring together key groups working on risk assessment for CO<sub>2</sub> storage from around the world to share knowledge and experiences. Emphasis on potential regulatory requirements with regard to CCS safety and impact assessment.
- Specific aims and objectives:
  - Develop an open and transparent process to allow different risk assessment approaches and associated results to be understood;
  - Provide a forum where different approaches to risk assessment can be compared;
  - Provide an 'umbrella group' for international collaboration;
  - Identify knowledge gaps and determine actions required to close these gaps;
  - Act as an informed body on risk assessment and to maintain dialogue with regulators and NGO's



### **Appendix 2: Breakout Group Results by Group**

Group 1

#### GAPS:

Projects risk (financial, social, organisational & etc) Data for ACQ not poss./access rights Benefit/cost analysis \$ CO<sub>2</sub> stored versus project cost Social Characterisation Systems approach: e.g.: risk reviews, risk management, optimisation Public policy: need info base? Policy drives risk ID, applying tech RA results to meeting policy goals List of tools, attributes Prioritise gaps per timing Understand phys, chem., coupling

#### TO DO:

Formalise objectives for network Answer "who are we?" Selectively broaden scope & population of R.A.N. & structure Set problem statements, propose mission Rank CCS generic risks that deserve work Define R.A.N. Define our audience

#### LEARNINGS:

Chat room/blog (restricted access) Produce documents to publish Collect references

#### Group 2:

#### GAPS:

Not quant., regulators role, data, calibration of models & validation Evaluation of existing models including procedures Pressure front Brine movement Geostatistics – distribution? How does the risk scale? Understanding EQ rupture in a reservoir EOR - CO<sub>2</sub> Induced seismicity, worst case scenarios Consideration of effects on other resources Human error – well operation/included in modelling

#### TO DO:

Sharing of data Broaden the network? Economists, political risk Biosphere Interaction with stakeholders

#### LEARNINGS:

IPAC Repository for methods & data sets Network must take care describing what it does (i.e.: performance assessment of reservoir etc) Provide info to mitigators & decision makers (sub surface mitigation) Need a formal definition of that the R.A. is for the network



Group 3

GAPS:

ERM (enterprise) Biosphere (deep) Mitigation – risk management Induced seismicity Expert elicitation process Acceptability limits Impact assessment & severity

#### TO DO:

Non-tech summary/guides Raise public awareness Involvement of wider audience (other disciplines) Regulator involvement IEA regulator network feedback Co-network meetings Support to international standards IPAC Explosion Encourage wider participation (discussions) Informal discussions (SPE/ATW forum) Very generalised conclusions

#### LEARNINGS:

Think tank for R.A. IPAC relationship



### **Appendix 3: Site Visit**

The meeting was followed by a trip to the CO2CRC Otway project, kindly organized and hosted by CO2CRC, to see first-hand the site and work that had been described during the Network meeting. Delegates saw the  $CO_2$  production well, the injection well, the monitoring well and the visitor centre, and had good discussions with the CO2CRC staff at Otway.





The Network attendees checking out a different source of CO<sub>2</sub>, close to Otway.



Photo 2: Attendees viewing Otway Project's CO<sub>2</sub> production well.



Photo 3: Rainbow over the Otway visitor centre.

### IEA GHG 4<sup>th</sup> Risk Assessment Network Meeting 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> April 2009 Rendezvous Hotel, Melbourne, Australia

Grant Arnold Scott Ayash Lisa Bacanskas Adrian Bowden Mark Bunch Rick Chalaturnyk Tim Dixon Andrew Feitz Matt Gerstenberger **Rick Hogan** Kenshi Itaoka **Charles Jenkins** John Kaldi Anna Korre Yannick Lefebvre Jason McKenna **Richard Metcalfe** Lindene Patton Namiko Ranasinghe Dave Ryan Frank Schilling Sandeep Sharma Steve Tantala Kate Townsend Sandrine Vida-Gilbert Charlie Voss Neil Wildgust David Wong

**Dept of Primary Industries** Energy & Environmental Research Center USFPA URS Australia Pty Ltd CO2CRC University of Alberta IEA GHG Geoscience Australia **GNS** Science AIG Australia Mizuho information & Research Institute CO2CRC CO2CRC Imperial College Schlumberger Carbon Services Woodside Energy Ltd. Quintessa Ltd **Zurich Financial Services Dept of Primary Industries** CanmetEnergy Universität Karlsruhe - KIT CO2CRC (Schlumberger) Dept. of Resources, Energy & Tourism **Dept of Primary Industries** CO2CRC Golder Associates IEA GHG **Dept of Primary Industries** 

Peta Ashworth Olivier Bouc Cirilo Bernardo Hannah Brackley **Rick Causebrook** Brian Davey Sevket Durucan John Gale Louise Goldie Divko Ken Knottavange-Tellen Simon James Hironobu Komaki Aleksandra Kalinowski Greg Leamon Ian McKay **Terry McKinley** Andy Nicol Jonathan Pearce **Richard Rhudy** Sohei Shimada Willie Senanayake Atsuko Tanaka Peter Tingate Jim Underschultz Claudia Vivalda Klaus Udo Weyer Malcolm Wilson

CSIRO BRGM CO2CRC/CanSyd **GNS** Science Geoscience Australia **Dept of Primary Industries** Imperial College IEA GHG GeoScience Australia Schlumberger Shell Technology India RITE Geoscience Australia Geoscience Australia FxxonMobil **Dept of Primary Industries GNS** Scisnce BGS EPRI University of Tokyo Dept. of Resources, Energy & Tourism AIST GeoScience Victoria CO2CRC and CSIRO Schlumberger WDA Consultants Inc University of Calgary



## 4th Risk Assessment Network Meeting

## 16th—17th April 2009 Rendezvous Hotel, Melbourne, Australia

Organised by

IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme and CO2CRC

Hosted by

CO2CRC





#### 16th April 2009 Day 1 08.15 to 08.30 Registration 08.45 to 09.00 Welcome Address: Tim Dixon, IEA GHG and John Kaldi CO2CRC 09.00 to 09.30 Welcome: Peter Batchelor, Victorian State Minister for Energy and Resources 09.30 to 10.00 Report from the 3rd Risk Assessment Meeting and the Joint Network Meeting; Neil Wildgust, IEA GHG 10.00 to 10.30 Coffee Break in The Vestibule Session 1: Reports from Other Initiatives Chair: Malcolm Wilson, University of Regina 10.30 to 10.50 Modelling Network: Neil Wildgust, IEA GHG 10.50 to 11.10 Well Integrity Network: Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta 11.10 to 11.30 IPAC: Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta 11.30 to 11.50 Risk Assessment Terminology Study: Anna Korre, Imperial College 11.50 to 12.00 CSLF Risk Assessment Taskforce: Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger 12.00 to 12.30 Discussion 12.30 to 13.30 Lunch at the Grill Restaurant Session 2: Quantification of Leakage Impacts Chair: Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger 13.30 to 13.45 Environmental Impacts workshop: Jonathan Pearce, BGS 13.45 to 14.00 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective 1: Jim Underschultz CO2CRC/CSIRO 14.00 to 14.15 Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective 2: Greg Leamon and Andrew Feitz, Geoscience Australia 14.15 to 14.30 Potential Impacts on Ground Water; Weyburn Perspective: Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta 14.30 to 14.45 Potential Impacts on Ground Water; A US Perspective: Lisa Bacanskas, US EPA 14.45 to 15.30 Discussion

#### 15.30 to 16.00 Coffee Break in The Vestibule

Session 3: Combining MMV, Modelling, and Risk Assessment Chair: Rick Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta			
16.00 to 16.20	US Regional Partnerships: Ken Hnottavange-Telleen, Schlumberger/MGSC		
16.20 to 16.40	Combining MMV, Modelling and Risk Assessment at the Otway Project: Charles Jenkins, CO2CRC		
16.40 to 17.00	The TESLA Risk Assessment Tool and System Modelling: Richard Metcalfe, Quintessa		
17.00 to 18.00	Discussion		

#### Close Day 1 19.30 Dinner in the Ballroom



## 17th April 2009 Day 2

Session 4-Risk Assessment and Insurance: Chair: Tim Dixon, IEA GHG

08.30 to 08.45 Setting the Scene: Lindene Patton, Zurich

08.45 to 10.00 Panel Session involving: Andy Nicol, GNS Simon James, Shell Pat Concessi, Deloitte &Touche Lindene Patton, Zurich

10.00 to 10.30 Coffee Break in The Vestibule

Session 5–Risk Communication: Chair: Tim Dixon, IEA GHG

- 10.30 to 11.00 Risk Communication: Peta Ashworth, CSIRO
- 11.00 to 11.20 Communication and Public Perception for the Otway Project: Sandeep Sharma, CO2CRC
- 11.20 to 11.40 Risk Communication a Government Perspective: Namiko Ranasinghe, Victorian State Government
- 11.40 to 12.30 Discussion
- 12.30 to 13.30 Lunch at the Grill Restaurant

#### Session 6– Updates From Real Projects: Chair: John Kaldi, CO2CRC

- 13.30 to 14.00 CO2 Sink: Frank Schilling, GFZ-Potsdam
- 14.00 to 14.30 Vattenfall German Demonstration: Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger
- 14.30 to 15.00 Weyburn: Adrian Bowden, URS
- 15.00 to 15.30 The Otway Project: Lincoln Paterson, CO2CRC
- 15.30 to 16.00 Discussion

#### 16.00 to 16.30 Coffee Break in The Vestibule

16.30 to 18.00 Workshop Conclusions: Key learning for other networks and summing-up including topics for next meeting: Tim Dixon, IEA GHG, Neil Wildgust, IEA GHG, John Kaldi, CO2CRC

Close Day 2




## 18th April 2009 Day 3

Itinerary for the Otway Project Tour

- 08.00 Bus departs Rendezvous Hotel
- 12.00 Arrive Boggy Creek Pub for lunch
- 13.30 Depart Boggy Creek Pub
- 14.00 to 16.30 Tour of the Otway CCS Project Site

20.00 Bus arrives back at the Rendezvous Hotel via Melbourne Tullamarine Airport.



## **IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme**

# 4th Risk Assessment Network Meeting

## **Co-organisers and hosts: CO2CRC**

Melbourne – 16-18 April 2009



## IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme


- A collaborative research programme founded in 1991
- Aim: Provide members with definitive information on the role that technology can play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
- Producing information that is:
  - Objective, trustworthy, independent
  - Policy relevant but NOT policy prescriptive
  - Reviewed by external Expert Reviewers
  - Subject to review of policy implications by Members
- Activities: Studies (>120); R&D networks :- Wells, Risk, Monitoring, Modelling, Oxy, Capture, Biofixation; Communications (GHGT9, IJGGC, etc); facilitating and focussing R&D and demonstration activities






## **R&D** Networks

- Bring together international key groups of experts to share knowledge and experience
- Identify and address knowledge gaps
- Act as informed bodies, eg for regulators
- CO2 geological storage assessing and managing risks
- Started in 2004/5
  - Risk Assessment Research Network
  - Monitoring Research Network
  - Wellbore Integrity Research Network
  - Modelling Network (2009)
- Benefit experts and wider stakeholders
- Depend on experts' time and inputs valuable and widely appreciated



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• 1<sup>st</sup> TNO, Netherlands, 2005



## **Risk Assessment Network**


- Overall aim: To bring together key groups working on risk assessment for CO<sub>2</sub> storage from around the world to share knowledge and experiences. Emphasis on potential regulatory requirements with regard to CCS safety and impact assessment.
- Specific aims and objectives:
  - Develop an open and transparent process to allow different risk assessment approaches and associated results to be understood;
  - Provide a forum where different approaches to risk assessment can be compared;
  - Provide an 'umbrella group' for international collaboration;
  - Identify knowledge gaps and determine actions required to close these gaps;
  - Act as an informed body on risk assessment and to maintain dialogue with regulators and NGO's



## 4<sup>th</sup> Risk Assessment Meeting Agenda

- 1. Reports from other initiatives
- 2. Leakage Impacts
- 3. Combining Monitoring, Modelling and Risk Assessment
- 4. Insurance and Risk Assessment
- 5. Risk Communication
- 6. Updates from Real Projects
- 7. Workshop Conclusions and Key Points for other Networks

CO2CRC Otway Project Site Visit



## **IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme**

# 4th Risk Assessment Network Meeting

## **Co-organisers and hosts: CO2CRC**

Melbourne – 16-18 April 2009




## DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES

## IEA GHG Risk Assessment Research Network Meeting




### Study Area and 2009 CCS Acreage Release Blocks





### Seal Capacity of the Gippsland Basin



### CO2CRC Otway Project Launch






### Monitoring Equipment at the Naylor-1 Well






### Victorian Legislation






### Energy Technology Innovation Strategy







### Transport Distances from the Latrobe Valley







### Report from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Risk Assessment Network & 1<sup>st</sup> Joint Network Meeting

IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme 4<sup>th</sup> Risk Assessment Network Meeting Melbourne 16-17 April 2007



# **3<sup>rd</sup> Risk Assessment Network**

- London
- August 2007
- Hosted by Imperial College
- Results in two parts:
  - Agenda and outcomes
  - Further issues/questions raised



# **3<sup>rd</sup> Risk Assessment Network**

- Topics discussed and outcomes:
  - Risk assessment terminology
    - Final report being presented here
  - How much site characterization is enough?
    - Not able to answer this yet
  - Quantitative vs. qualitative risk assessment
    - We can currently only achieve semi-quantitative at best
  - The FEP risk assessment process
    - One tool of many, best suited to an auditing tool



# **3<sup>rd</sup> Risk Assessment Network**

- Further issues/questions raised:
  - Do we require risk assessment guidelines?
  - How can we best incorporate expert judgement into the risk assessment process?
  - How confident are we of the modelling results?
  - How long do you need to monitor for?
  - Can the accident/worst case scenario approach work for CCS risk assessment?
  - How can we better communicate risk?



- New York
- June 2008
- Hosted by the US Environmental Protection Agency
- Results in two parts:
  - Technical gaps
  - Operational or Network Gaps



- Technical Gaps
  - There is a need to better identify the regulators for a CCS project
  - We need more information about leakage through the wellbore – statistics, classification, causes
  - What are the impacts of leakage into shallow marine environments and potable aquifers?
    - How do we quantify the impacts
  - What are the differences between risk assessment modelling and front end process modelling



- Technical Gaps cont.
  - We need to benchmark existing projects
  - How do you incorporate M&V into RA process ( and vice versa)
  - How is public confidence linked to risk assessment
  - How do we better engage insurers, regulators and NGO's
  - How do we perform risk screening for site selection
  - What are the risks associated with co-contaminants



- Network gaps:
  - Risk and monitoring networks are not sufficiently integrated
  - Need to communicate with new IEA regulator network



# and New Network

- Formation of IEA GHG modelling network debated at JNM in June 2008
- Agreed first step to hold modelling workshop
- Aims of workshop:
  - Examine approaches to modelling
  - Discuss confidence in current approaches
  - Debate input to risk assessments and regulatory aspects
  - Identify current knowledge gaps and limitations
  - Discuss potential aims and next steps for formation of a modelling network



# **Workshop Details**

- Workshop hosted by BRGM in Orleans, France, 10<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> February 2009
- Co-organised by IEA GHG, BRGM, Schlumberger and CO2GeoNet
- Sponsored by IFP and Total
- Over 100 registered delegates from 14 different countries, representing industry, consultants and academia



### **Social events**

**Civic reception** 



### Gala dinner



# Workshop Structure

- Introductory session included an overview of CO<sub>2</sub> storage modelling (Isabelle Czernichowski) and regulatory perspective (IEA GHG)
- Sessions on modelling objectives, processes, special issues and formation of network
- Presentations from invited speakers followed by breakout discussions and plenary feedback




# **Modelling Objectives Session**

- Presentations:
- Storage capacity (Bert van der Meer, TNO)
- Injectivity (Yann le Gallo, Geogreen)
- Caprock integrity (Brian McPherson, Utah Uni)
- Plume evolution (Sylvain Thibeau, Total)
- Leakage through wellbores (Mike Celia, Princeton)
- Leakage through faults (Andrew Cavanagh, Permedia)



### 'Affected space' concept



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### **Discussions on Objectives**

- Discussions focussed on current models in relation to reservoirs, caprock and leakage
- Considerable work remains
- Modelling of potential leakage uncertain
- Divergence of approaches
- Sharing of information and benchmarking



### **Processes Session**

- Presentations:
- Geological models (Peter Frykman, GEUS)
- Multiphase flow (Suzanne Hurter, Schlumberger)
- Geochemistry (Mohammed Azaroual, BRGM)
- Geomechanics (Jonny Rutqvist, LBNL)
- Thermal effects (Jens Birkholzer, LBNL)



### **Discussions on Processes**

- Significant knowledge gaps:
- General issues include coupling of processes, up-scaling from pore to field scale, heterogeneity, input data availability
- Many specific knowledge gaps highlighted e.g. relative permeability, reaction kinetics, fault properties and reactivation, stress fields, formation compressibility



# **Special Issues Session**

- Presentations:
- Code comparisons (Holger Class, Stuttgart Uni)
- Model comparisons (Jens Birkholzer, LBNL)
- Numerical tools (Anthony Michel, IFP)
- Modelling and monitoring (Susan Hovorka, University of Texas)
- Modelling and risk assessment (Rajesh Pawar, LANL)



# **Discussion on Special Issues**

- Discussions centred on how modelling relates to monitoring and risk, also confidence in current modelling capabilities
- Iterative nature of storage assessment
- Current model reliability may be hampered more by lack of input data than understanding?
- Modelling predicts distribution of free phase CO<sub>2</sub> – main risk source



### **Formation of Network**

- Agreement that an international modelling network would be worthwhile and could make significant contribution
- Recognition that modelling is a distinct specialisation feeding into risk assessment
- RA network could form 'over arching' risk management network with inputs from modelling, wellbore and monitoring networks



# Modelling Network Aims and Objectives

- Aim: provide an international forum for experts to share knowledge and promote collaboration
- Some specific objectives:
  - Online discussion forum and reference material
  - Guidance documents for practitioners
  - Guidance to non-technical specialists
  - Identification of knowledge gaps
  - Support to RA network



# **Modelling Network Next Steps**

- Workshop report to be issued in May, following circulation of draft to steering committee
- Summary presentation of workshop outcomes to RA and monitoring networks
- Modelling network website:
  - Online discussion forum
  - Links to benchmarking studies
- First network meeting planned for February 2010 (University of Utah)



### **Overview of Well Integrity Network**

### Wellbore Integrity Network



(Summary Presentation from JNM in New York)

Bill Carey (Los Alamos National Lab) Craig Gardner (Chevron Energy Technology Company)

> **Rick Chalaturnyk** University of Alberta

> > April 16, 2009



### **Network Charter**

 The long-term ability of wellbores to retain CO<sub>2</sub> has been identified as a significant potential risk for the long-term security of geologic storage facilities

 Assess and communicate the state of knowledge, nature of research programs, and the research needs to understand the long-term integrity of wellbore systems in CO<sub>2</sub>-rich environments





# **Steering Committee Members**

- Toby Aiken, IEA GHG
- Idar Akervoll, SINTEF
- Stefan Bachu, Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board
- Bill Carey (chair), LANL
- Mike Celia, Princeton University
- Walter Crow, BP
- Rich Chalaturnyk, University of Alberta
- John Gale, IEA GHG





### **Network Objectives**

- Determine impact of CO<sub>2</sub> interaction with wellbore materials on long term storage
- Bring together experts working on CCS
- Assess current level of understanding
- Develop R&D priorities
- Facilitate collaborative research efforts
- Collect and develop field experience
- Provide recommendations of field monitoring and integrity evaluation
- Provide recommendations for remediation
- Foster and provide leadership for experimental and numerical studies
- Provide guidance on policy and regulations



### Wellbore Integrity Focus Areas

- Field studies of CO<sub>2</sub> in the wellbore environment including EOR and natural CO<sub>2</sub> reservoirs
- Field monitoring and evaluation methods 2.
- Remediation approaches
- Experimental studies on cement-CO<sub>2</sub> 4. interactions including new cement formulations
- Numerical modeling of CO<sub>2</sub> in the near-wellbore 5. environment and in field-scale studies of multiple-well interactions
- Risk, Best Practices, and Policies and 6. Regulations

# Summary of Key Issues (from JNM) - I

- Wellbore integrity problems exist in oil and gas operations (e.g., SCP). We need to develop a basis for evaluating leakage potential from legacy wells
- Laboratory experiments on CO<sub>2</sub>-cement need to reconcile effects of key variables: confining pressure, fluid flow, matrix vs. interface flow, and effect of reservoir rock
- New approaches to wellbore remediation and methods to evaluate the potential costs of remediation are needed

EA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Melbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009



# Summary of Key Issues (from JNM) - 2

- New CO<sub>2</sub>-resistant cements are in development and methods for evaluating their performance and determining their suitability are needed
- Casing and tubular corrosion may be more rapid than cement degradation but their role in integrity is unclear
- More sensitive and diagnostic logging and field monitoring tools are needed

IEA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Melbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009



## Summary of Key Issues (from JNM) - 3

- Numerical models of wellbore geochemistry and geomechanics need additional development for providing long-term predictions
- Numerical models incorporating realistic permeability distributions for wells are needed to evaluate the leakage potential of fields with multiple wells
- Integrated geomechanical and geochemical experiments/numerical models are needed to capture full range of wellbore behavior

EA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Aelbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009



## Summary of Key Issues (from JNM) – 4

- Integrated field evaluations in fields with long CO<sub>2</sub> exposure are needed to develop logging/monitoring methods, understand mechanisms of CO<sub>2</sub>-induced degradation, and assess effective permeability of the wellbore
- Data mining of the rich resources available in private companies and regulatory bodies should be a priority for developing a statistical basis for evaluation of wellbore performance



## Needs (as Identified from JNM)

Information on frequency of failure

- Well failure in new CO<sub>2</sub>-EOR fields
- Help in modeling potential leak rates
- Informs Risk Assessment activities
- Assessment of steel and elastomer interactions with CO<sub>2</sub> and the likely effect on long-term isolation
- Costs and impacts of remediation
- Long-term numerical modeling grounded in enhanced field and experimental data





#### Interface with Other Networks

#### Risk

- We are working toward the development of risk-based assessments of wellbore performance
- We are interested in the approaches being used by the Risk Network

## Monitoring

 Our monitoring efforts are primarily for evaluation of wellbore integrity—less emphasis on detecting leaks



#### **Network Future Goals**

 Develop consensus (?) document on the potential impact of wellbore behavior on storage site performance

### Wellbore Integrity Meeting in Calgary, Alberta on May 13 and 14, 2009

Session 2: Risk and Regulatory Environment for Wellbore Integrity

 Well blowout rates and consequences in California Oil and Gas District 4 from 1991 to 2005,

Preston Jordan, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab

 CO2 Storage--Managing the Risks of Wellbore Leakage over Long Timescales,

Rabih Chammas, Olivier Poupard, Oxand

- Qualitative and semi-quantitative risk assessment methods to evaluate potential CO2 leakage pathways through wells, Claudia Vivalda, Schlumberger
- Regulatory practices in Alberta, Tristan Goodman, ECRB
- Well Abandonment Practices Study, TNO



#### **Session 3: Field Studies of Wellbore Integrity**

Wellbore integrity in the North Sea

Tor Harald Hanssen, StatoilHydro

CO<sub>2</sub> Capture Project results from Buracica, Brazil Walter Crow

Salt Creek EOR experience Ken Hendricks, Anadarko

Wellbore Database at Weyburn, Canada Rick Chalaturnyk, U. of Alberta

Measuring and understanding CO<sub>2</sub> leaks in injection wells: experience from MovECBM Matteo Loizzo, Schlumberger

Effective Zonal Isolation for CO<sub>2</sub> Sequestration Ron Sweatman, Haliburton



#### Session 4:Wellbore Remediation, Leakage and Alternative Practices


- CO<sub>2</sub> injection well conversion and repair
  - Mark Woitt, RPS Energy
- Use of alternative cement formulations in the oilfield
  - Don Getzlaf, Cemblend
- Microseismic studies revealing leakage pathways,
  - Marco Bohnhoff, Stanford University
- Long term sealing of GHG sequestration wells,
  - Homer Spencer





#### Session 6: Experimental studies of Wellbore Processes

- Experimental studies on wellbore cements,
  - Karoosh Ashgari, University of Regina
- Experimental assessment of brine and/or CO<sub>2</sub> leakage through well cements at reservoir conditions
  - Brant Bennion, Hycal
- Impact of CO<sub>2</sub> on Class G cement, static and dynamic long term tests
  - Francois Rodot and André Garnier, Total





#### **Session 7: Modeling of Wellbore Processes**

- Simulating leakage through well cement: coupled reactive flow in a micro-annulus
  - Laure Deremble, Schlumberger
- Modelling of wellbore cement alteration as a consequence of  $CO_2$ , injection in exploited gas reservoirs
  - Claudio Geloni, Saipem

#### Session 8: Quo Vadis: Future Direction of the Wellbore Integrity Network

**1elbourne**, Australia 2009 8



**Status Report Issued by the Wellbore Integrity Network: Elements and Outline** 

## Wellbore Integrity Network



#### Risk

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- We are working toward the development of risk-based assessments of wellbore performance
- We are interested in the approaches being used by the Risk Network

#### **Rick Chalaturnyk** University of Alberta

April 16, 2009

IEA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Melbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009



Overview of IPAC  $CO_2$  – an International Performance Assessment Centre for Geological Storage of  $CO_2$ 

# HEAFE -

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**Rick Chalaturnyk** 

University of Alberta



#### What is IPAC-CO2?

"IPAC-CO2 is an international panel for the independent evaluation and advancement of risk and performance assessment of geological storage of carbon dioxide"

 IPAC-CO2 provides and advances global expertise to independently benchmark, evaluate and provide advice on geological storage. It responds to the needs of the public, policymakers, regulators, developers and others." Statement of Intent, Paris, 2009



## A Role for IPAC-CO2

- IPAC-CO2 was founded to provide standards and guidelines for verification of CCS.
- IPAC-CO2 will not compete with private sector risk assessment companies.
- It will instead provide the overarching level of confidence that will be needed by the public, regulators and those looking to store CO2 that the appropriate standards are in place and have been adhered to in the development of risk assessment for geological storage.
- Without an independent group—displaying transparency in undertaking the necessary oversight, conducting research to fill gaps in knowledge and benchmarking to understand predictive outputs of long-term storage—there will always be questions about the validity of risk assessment for geological storage and the establishment of a value on liability.
- Geological storage of CO2, globally, will face significant challenges without an independent organization like IPAC-CO2 conducting the evaluation of risk assessment and providing assurance of standards being met.



- IPAC-CO2, established with \$5 million each from the Government of Saskatchewan and Royal Dutch Shell, is an independent research organization affiliated with the University of Regina.
- The core team of IPAC-CO2 scientists from multiple Canadian universities was instrumental in conducting the research for the IEA's "Weyburn-Midale CO2 Monitoring & Storage Project," which is North America's most significant CCS research undertaking.
- IPAC-CO2's <u>business model</u> will expand upon what is commonly found at many leading research institutions in that it will provide the overview services needed by industry, regulators and the public.
- IPAC-CO2's technical leadership and far-reaching institutional relationships will allow it to build a networked organization which harnesses best-in-class skill sets—and makes those skills available to CCS development around the world.
- Nodes are planned for Canada, USA, Europe, Australia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa.
- IPAC-CO2's organizational framework is designed to flexibly address a wide range of technical challenges and commercial concerns. This will be done by bringing some of the best minds in risk assessment to work within a <u>collaborative framework</u>, to advance specific CCS development and acceptance.
- Diversified participation and funding without undue influence from any special interest or market segment will allow IPAC-CO2 to operate in an environment that is transparent, impartial and technology-neutral.




### **Early Structure for IPAC-CO2**

#### **IPAC Framework**


#### <u>Key goals:</u>

- 1. assess CCS project risk and advise as to appropriate risk management
- 2. answer technical and other questions to enable CCS projects to proceed
  - 3. engage with and educate various stakeholders and publics re: CCS to increase acceptance
- 4. network internationally to ensure learnings from other researchers are built upon and/or utilized









IEA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Melbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009

A CONTRACTOR

Overview of IPAC  $CO_2$  – an International Performance Assessment Centre for Geological Storage of  $CO_2$ 

# HEAFE -

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**Rick Chalaturnyk** 

University of Alberta

#### CO<sub>2</sub> Storage Risk Assessment

#### **Terminology Study**

Anna Korre, Sevket Durucan Department of Earth Science and Engineering

Imperial College London



#### Outline

- Objectives of the work
- Review of the international state of the art in risk assessment and management guidelines
- Risk assessment and management for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects
- Example extract from the terminology database
  - Data oriented terms
  - Action oriented terms
- What happens next ...

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Page 2

#### **Objectives**

The objective of this work has been to develop and propose internationally harmonised terminology for  $CO_2$  storage risk assessment.

It is not a goal to standardise risk assessments globally. Instead, harmonisation is thought of as an effort to strive for consistency among approaches

- to enhance understanding of the various approaches to CO<sub>2</sub> storage risk assessment worldwide
- facilitate the mutual use and acceptance of the assessment of CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects between countries, saving resources for both governments and the industry.

Target groups of users of the harmonised terms are CO<sub>2</sub> storage and environment professionals and political actors at all levels.

# Review of the international state of the art in risk assessment and management guidelines

In providing this harmonising terminology, it was considered essential to review

- the international literature and regulations on risk assessment and management (EU, US EPA, AS/NZ Standards, US NAS/NRC) and
- key glossaries and terminology compilations developed by international organisations, regulatory agencies and authoritative associations (e.g. WHO, EU, US EPA, US NRC, IPCC).
- The recent guidance, technical support documentation and proposed regulations for CO<sub>2</sub> geological storage
  - OSPAR Framework for Risk Assessment and Management of Storage of CO<sub>2</sub> Streams in Geological Formations (2007)
  - EC Directive for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects (2008)
  - US EPA Vulnerability Evaluation Framework for Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide (July 2008)
  - US EPA Federal Requirements under the Underground Injection Control Program for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells (July 2008)

#### **Fields of Risk Assessment**

Historically, risk assessment has been dominated by two parallel methodological developments:


public-health risk assessment, focus on the health effects of chronic exposures to chemicals, contaminants, and pollutants in the water, the air and the food. engineered-systems risk assessment, focus on immediate and delayed effects due to the failure of systems, (e.g. aerospace vehicles, chemical process plants, and nuclear power plants).

More recently there has been heightened interest in other risks including ecological risks (e.g. the degradation of ecological systems due to nonnative invasive species, global warming, and genetically modified organisms); risks related to severe natural phenomena (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, and floods); and risks associated with malicious human acts (terrorism).

Page 5

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# Which impact categories/receptors should be included in risk assessment for CO<sub>2</sub> geological storage




#### How do the Risk Assessment steps relate with Risk Management and Risk Communication

Regulatory actions are based on two distinct elements:

Risk assessment is the use of the factual base to define the effects of exposure of individuals or populations to hazardous materials and situations.

Risk management is the process of weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action, integrating the results of risk assessment with engineering data and with social, economic, and political concerns to reach a

decision.



Risk management process overview (AS/NZS 4360:2004)

Page 7

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#### **OSPAR Framework for Risk Assessment** and Management Problem formulation Site selection &

Planning

Operation

Site-closure

Post-closure

Construction

Problem Formulation: critical scoping step, describing the boundaries of the assessment

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Risk management

Risk characterisation

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Ettects assesment

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Exposure assessment

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characterisation

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
 $\mathbf{N}$ 

- Site characterisation: collection and evaluations of data concerning the site (capacity, integrity, leakage pathways, monitoring options, surrounding area)
- Exposure assessment: characterisation and movement of the CO<sub>2</sub> stream (properties of CO<sub>2</sub> stream, exposure processes and pathways, likelihood, scale)
- Effects assessment: assembly of information to describe the response of receptors
- **Risk characterisation:** integration of exposure and effect data to estimate the likely impact (impact hypothesis with performance criteria, qualitative or quantitative)
- Risk management: including monitoring, mitigation and remediation measures


#### How do the Risk Assessment steps relate with Risk Management and Risk Communication


Risk assessment is the use of the factual base to define the effects of exposure of individuals or populations to hazardous materials and situations. Risk management is the process of weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action, integrating the results of risk assessment with engineering data and with social, economic, and political concerns to reach a decision.

> International Program on Chemical Safety/ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004



#### Level of detail required in risk analysis






Risk management process overview (AS/NZS 4360:2004)


Page 10


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Using threat, criticality and vulnerability to inform risk analysis (AS/NZS HB 167:2006)


#### Level of detail required in risk analysis








# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and Communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects




Risk assessment, management and communication framework for  $CO_2$  storage projects

- OSPAR Framework for Risk Assessment and Management of Storage of CO<sub>2</sub> Streams in Geological Formations (2007)
- EC Directive for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects (2008)
- US EPA Vulnerability Evaluation Framework for Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide (July 2008)




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# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects



# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects

#### **Risk Source Assessment**

Tier 1

Scenario analysis tools FEPs analysis tools VEF analysis Conceptual model development tools

Data requirements: modest, use of generic data

#### A. Site Selection

- B. Storage Licensing
- C. Operation, Closure
- D. Post-closure

#### **Risk evaluation**

Risk likelihood (likely, ..., unlikely) and Significance (negligible, marginal, significant)

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# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and Communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects

- A. Site Selection
- B. Storage Licensing
- C. Operation, closure
- D. Post-closure

#### Risk Source Assessment

Tier 1

Scenario analysis tools FEPs analysis tools VEF analysis Conceptual model development tools Treatment of uncertainties System level modelling

Data requirements: generic data coarse site specific data (aggregation, audit)

#### **Risk evaluation**

Risk and significance qualitative, semi-quantitative

Performance: CO<sub>2</sub> flux Ecosystem acceptable levels(?)

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# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and Communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects

#### **Exposure assessment**

Tier 2

Process level modelling tools fluid flow codes; geochemical codes; geomechanical codes, ... ecosystem modelling codes(?) System level models Treatment of uncertainties, natural heterogeneity (geological model)

Data requirements: site specific data, surrogate data from analogue sites (data audit)

- A. Site Selection
- B. Storage Licensing
- C. Operation, Closure
- D. Post-closure

#### **Risk evaluation**

Risk and significance quantitative

Performance: CO<sub>2</sub> flux (volume, timescale) Receptor based thresholds (?)

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Page 19

# Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and Communication for CO<sub>2</sub> storage projects

Tier 3 Effects assessment and Risk characterisation

Ecosystem modelling ecotoxicity assessment, biodiversity impact assessment, dose - response curves

#### Data requirements:

experimental data from laboratory and field studies


- A. Site Selection
- B. Storage Licensing
- C. Operation, Closure
- D. Post-closure

#### **Risk evaluation**

Receptor based thresholds (?)

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## CO<sub>2</sub> storage RA terminology development: What happens next ...

The definitions for the higher-priority generic and specific terms extracted from the "key documents and sources" has been circulated (e.g., through IEA GHG RA network, the research community and industry) for review and comments. Once the report is finalised it will be made available widely in a wikipedia style database as a live document with respondents able to:

- identify or provide their preferred definition for each term
- identify terms considered as synonyms
- indicate whether any important key documents or sources should be included as they become available.



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Imperial College London







IEA-GHG Risk Assessment Network Meeting Melbourne - April 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup>, 2009

**Report from:** 

CSLF Risk-Assessment Task Force

### **Task Force History and Mission**

- At the joint meeting of the CSLF Technical and Policy Groups in London (November 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> 2006), the CSLF Technical Group formed a Task Force (TF) to examine risk assessment standards and procedures.
- This TF was formed to address a need identified in the CSLF strategic plan.
- In phase I of its activities, this Task Force was expected to examine risk-assessment standards, procedures, and research activities relevant to <u>unique risks</u> associated with the injection and long-term storage of CO<sub>2</sub>

### Task Force Membership

- Australia
- Canada
- France
- India
- Japan

- Netherlands
- > Norway

- United Kingdom
- United States, chair
- IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme



www.crlforum.org

#### **Phase I Status**

- Phase I draft report edited and revised
- Summary of ongoing risk assessment activities expanded
- Recommendations finalized at the CSLF Technical Group meeting in Oslo (April 1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> 2009)
- Final draft to Secretariat mid-April for circulation to the Technical Group for review



www.c/lforum.org

## Potential Impacts Considered

- Impingement on pore space not covered under deed or agreement;
- Impingement on other subsurface resources;
- Change in local subsurface stress fields and geo-mechanical properties;
- Impact on the groundwater and/or surface water;
- Elevated soil-gas CO<sub>2</sub> in terrestrial ecosystems;
- Accumulation in poorly ventilated spaces or in low lying areas subject to poor atmospheric circulation;
- CO<sub>2</sub> or other displaced gases (such as methane) return to the atmosphere.

www.c/lforum.org

#### Summary of Ongoing Risk Assessment Activities/Projects

#### Project Title:

#### Include a short title or description of the project.

Lead Organization(s) and Point(s) of Contact (w/e-mail): Focus on lead; the intent is to provide a point of contact as opposed to be inclusive on participants.

#### Duration:

State and completion dates (if applicable): ???

Injection and monitoring dates (if applicable): ???

Dates & short description of key risk assessment milestones: ???

#### Scale of Injection (if applicable):

For example, XXX tons per year for YYY years. Please spell "million" as applicable.

#### **Risk Assessment Methodology:**

Include a brief description of the approach and tools used for risk assessment.

#### **Brief Summary:**

Include a short narrative on the project, discussing key goals and key milestones.

If the project includes a field effort, include a brief site description (and/or reference).

#### Key Risk Assessment Findings (if applicable)

Include a short description of key findings and publications/documents from the project, as they relate to risk assessment.

Note any lessons learned.

If there is a website link to project summary, please provide.

- Form circulated by Secretariat
- Current Summaries
  - Australia
  - Canada
  - France

Japan

**USA** 

IFA

– France-Germany

### Carbon Sequestration leadership forum www.cslforum.org

**Issues requiring further action** 

- A gap assessment to identify CCS-specific tools and methodologies that will be needed to support risk assessment.
- The feasibility of developing general technical guidelines for risk assessment practices that could be adapted to specific sites and local needs, and subsequently development of such guidelines.

# Recommendations to consider passing to the Policy Group

• The link between risk assessment and liability should be recognized and considered.

• The use of risk assessment to ensure successful performance at storage sites should be considered in the context of stakeholder outreach and communication.



## Defining R&D Needs to Assess Environmental Impacts of Potential Leaks from CO<sub>2</sub> Storage, IEA GHG / BGS Workshop, Nottingham, UK, 15-17<sup>th</sup> September, 2008.

Julie West, Jonathan Pearce, Toby Aiken, Tim Dixon

Kingsley Dunham Centre Keyworth Nottingham NG12 5GG Tel 0115 936 3100

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## **Objectives**

- To bring together experts from research communities not necessarily already involved in CCS
- To review the potential impacts on both terrestrial and marine ecosystems of (post-injection) leaks from CO<sub>2</sub> storage sites.
  - Reviewing existing knowledge and current research
  - Identifying gaps in knowledge of possible concern to regulators
- To identify future research and demonstration needs



## Agenda

- Selected viewpoints of different stakeholder groups were presented
  - Regulators
  - Industry
  - Public
  - Research
- Recent and current research activities presented
  - IEAGHG Terrestrial and marine impact reviews
  - Field-based research:
    - experimental
    - analogue systems
- R&D needs were identified and prioritised



## **Industry needs**

- Leakage rates must be realistic and quantified to allow credible scenarios to be defined
- A defined scope for Environmental Impact Assessments is needed
  - To include costs and priorities
  - Demonstrate ability to 'learn by doing',
  - Extrapolation of lessons from specific research
- Database of analogue sites, both leakage and non-leakage
- Database of experimental sites
- Monitoring guidelines;
  - Timescale issues how long to monitor for? Over what period should EIAs be considered?
  - Access to baseline data
  - What monitoring techniques should be used?



## **Regulator needs**

- Strategic overviews of potential storage locations
- Database of experimental and analogue sites, to include an interpretation of data and figures
- Decision tools / frameworks, such as GIS based tools, to support site leasing and licensing
- Real project data is needed to understand environmental risks
- Identified indicator species and reference ecosystems
- Sensitivity thresholds of indicator species and ecosystems



## **Public needs**

- Involvement of local interest groups,
- Consultation would include consideration of
  - The needs of the general public / local communities?
  - What level of detail is appropriate?
    - Education;
    - Knowledge of natural leaks,
    - Knowledge of the characteristics of CO<sub>2</sub>
- Need to identify those issues of greatest importance to the public:
  - examples might include groundwater and marine protection
- Terminology is an issue that was raised repeatedly throughout the workshop
  - For example: EC Storage Directive terms such as 'significant' and 'limited' which will require definition.



## **Research needs**

- Environmental impacts at ecosystem level;
- Impacts of chronic exposure and physiologic responses,
- Identify reference / target species
- Groundwater quality issues;
  - Validation of models,
- Formation of a database for natural analogues,
- Timescales for future performance assessments;
  - Definition of operational period / monitoring period,
- Pathways between reservoirs and the surface;
- Rates of leakage and associated impacts
  - Effects of coupled or multiple stressors on individual ecosystems,
  - Definition of spatial scale of impact / monitoring regime;
- Development of appropriate scenarios



## Prioritised gaps to be addressed

- An understanding of the consequences, both positive and negative, of CO<sub>2</sub> and other coreleased species or substances,
- Likely impact, and extent of impact of pH changes, mobilisation of heavy metals and brine intrusion on groundwater quality,
- Effects of brine displacement



## Other gaps to be addressed

- Local environmental impacts at ecosystem level
- Impact on surface freshwater ecosystems
- Identification of target and key indicator species
- Thresholds of exposure and definition of "acceptable" flux rates
- Distinctions between acute versus chronic effects
- Analysis of the reaction rates involved in the processes
- Development of monitoring techniques, for specific issues
- The effects of multiple or coupled stressors



## Monitoring and EIA

- Collaboration between the monitoring and risk assessment communities is needed for development of monitoring techniques.
- Monitoring should be directed to address EIA's as well as CO<sub>2</sub> storage security.
  - For discussion by the IEA GHG International Research Network on Monitoring.
- Risk assessment should give the end points that monitoring programmes will be designed to address.
- There must be clarity between monitoring for risk assessment and for risk management.



## Monitoring and EIA

- The size and location of areas to be monitored will be site-specific.
- Similarly the frequency, density and types of monitoring will reflect site-specific conditions and local regulations.
  - E.g. Protected habitats, groundwaters, target species
- While effects of leaks at some natural analogue sites suggest impacts could be reasonably localised, the location of leak may be less predictable.
- The potential for leaks into groundwaters used as public water supplies may prevent some storage projects receiving approval.



## Addressing issues identified

- Identification of reference species:
  - Should include commercially important species.
  - Assessment should include multiple stressors (fishing, acidification & pollution)
  - Marine reference species could include corals (strongly susceptible?), shellfish and nematodes (more tolerant?).
  - Terrestrial reference organisms could include legumes (more susceptible), grasses (cereals), and possibly worms.
- For validation of groundwater models purposeful injection into aquifers is unlikely to be permitted
  - So could use natural analogues if appropriate systems can be identified.
- A combination of laboratory, mesocosm, field-scale leakage experiments, analogue studies and modelling can be used.



## Summary

- Credible leakage scenarios need to be defined
  - to put leakage into context
  - to enable experimental studies to be appropriately constrained
  - to define scope of EIAs
- An analogues database was proposed
- Target species and threshold levels are needed
- Responses of ecosystems and target species to multiple stressors (including co-released species) is a key gap
- Monitoring will need to assess potential impacts
- A combination of laboratory, mesocosm, field-scale leakage experiments, analogue studies and modelling would address gaps
- Some opportunities for funding were noted.
- Meeting report by Toby Aiken available from IEAGHG

## IEA: 4<sup>th</sup> Risk Assessment Network Potential Impacts on Groundwater: An Australian Perspective

Jim Underschultz


(CSIRO Petroleum and CO2CRC)





## Issues

#### Australia is dry, we are in drought, our population is growing.





## **Issues: Water Resources are Crucial**

- Off-shore
  - injection may shift the Freshwater-Saltwater interface on-shore
- On-Shore
  - Fault seal and top seal containment security and leakage into shallow groundwater resources
  - Very deep brackish groundwater resources
  - Great Artesian Basin
  - Induced saline leakage (flux) from the top seal

**Related Issues: Ground heave and infrastructure security** 




## **Commercial Scale Volumes**


## Eg. Latrobe Valley in Victoria

- New Power Stations designed for CCS plus some retro-fit
- ~50 Mt/yr for 30 years = 1500 Mt total
- Do we have anything comparable to use as an analogue of how the basin framework and contained fluids will respond?







#### Virgin Hydraulic Head (mSS)



#### Mid 1990's Hydraulic Head (mSS)



### **Gippsland Basin Victoria**








## **Subsidence**


### **Predicted realistic subsidence year 2031**



С

### **Inundation risk maps**


## Year 2031



#### **Potential vertical leakage**

- Leaking Wells
- Leaking Top Seal
- Leaking Faults
- Can we understand the fluxes? Reactivated Leaking Faults
- Some examples of our research on Fault Leakage












#### **SGR-Buoyancy Pressure Calibration**

Calibrating Seal Capacity vs SGR




Seal failure envelopes at stable hydrocarbon traps















This is the largest displacement slip surface. It is slightly hidden because of the angle the photo was taken from!

6-7m / Displacement 3-4m / Displacement Highly smoothed / ploshed footwall face. V planar boundary to fault zone


Zone of 'smeared' 'clayey' material

Fault zone core dominantly sandy gouge

Deformation band network distributed thru sandy gouge


Main slip surface detail

#### Fault zone heterogeneity



#### **Vertical versus lateral fault leakage**

#### Water











# **Two-phase flow modelling**




**Fault Zone Architecture and Fault Reactivation Risk** 

Objective: to model deformation and fluid flow and constrain the behaviour of fault structures and assess structural permeability variation and trap integrity






# Key control – fault length







## Key control – large faults and fluid flow




Fluid flow velocities  $(x10^9 \text{ m.s}^{-1})$ 

S 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 >16

CSIRO


Consistent with and support a hydrocarbon preservation model for the Timor Sea: hydrocarbons tend to be preserved in the traps bound by smaller faults with low post-rift displacements, commonly overlapped by larger high displacement faults







#### **Complex fault population – Sunrise Field**



#### **Potential Impacts on Groundwater**

- We are directing R&D to reduce uncertainty in characterisation of groundwater contamination risks associated with carbon storage, including:
- Shifting the saltwater freshwater interface
- Ground heave
- Top Seal leakage
- Fault Seal leakage Across Fault
- Fault Seal Leakage Up Fault
- Fault Reactivation Transient flux



#### **CO2CRC** Participants



Supporting participants: Australian Greenhouse Office | Australian National University | | CANSYD | Meiji University | The Process Group | University of Queensland |









**Australian Government** 

**Geoscience** Australia

### **Potential Impacts on Ground Water**


## An Australian Perspective

Andrew Feitz, Tim Ransley Greg Leamon Geoscience Australia

## **Geoscience Australia - Canberra**




#### 2009 offshore release areas for GHG storage



Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective, 17 April 2009


#### **Basins for onshore CO<sub>2</sub> storage**



Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective, 17 April 2009


#### **Great Artesian Basin**

- 1.7 million km<sup>2</sup>
- 100 3000m deep
- 30 100°C
- 65,000,000 GL (100,000 Sydney harbours)
- Extraction 570 GL/yr
- Mostly freshwater
- 0.5 2.5 m/yr
- Value \$4+ billion/yr



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
#### Natural analogues

- Properties of groundwater chemistry in high CO<sub>2</sub> environments
- Regional variations in water quality
- Environmental impacts, e.g. coal seam gas


**GEOSCIENCE AUSTRALIA** 

• Well bore integrity

## **Great Artesian Basin**




#### **Great Artesian Basin cross-section**




#### Poorest quality aquifers are typically the shallowest

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### 3,100 artesian wells






0 500 Kilometers

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## 35,000 sub-artesian wells




0 500 Kilometers

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**Location of Non-Flowing Waterbores** 


#### **Decrease in water level**



Regional drawdown (m) of the potentiometric surface (1880-1970)

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RADKE ET AL, 2000




#### Production of a 3D Geological Block Model (gOcad voxet)


OI\_KSRUI (WINTON) D2\_KSRIN (MACKUNDA) `03\_KLRO (TOOLEBUC) ÒЧ\_KSR (RÓLLING DOUINS) OG\_KSCO (CADNA-OUTE) 06\_JŚYH (HOORAY) `07 JSBH HUTTON D8\_RSMÓ (MOOLAYEMBER) `09\_RSL (CLEMAŤIS)

#### VERTICAL EXAGGERATION = 50 TIMES

FIGURE COURTESY OF GA URANIUM SYSTEMS PROJECT


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Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective, 17 April 2009

# **Reported CO<sub>2</sub> levels in wells**



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#### Water chemistry data for the GAB

- Approx. 90,000 water chemistry records for GAB (<15,000 suitable)</li>
- >1000m depth, only have ~1000 data points (1.7 million km<sup>2</sup>)
- Only 20 data points for arsenic

# **Gases in production water**



Source: CSIRO Petroleum (Glyn Corona11, NSW)

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# Impacts of GHG storage on groundwater

- Potential contamination of freshwater resources
- Release of gases from produced waters
- Boosting pressure in depleted groundwater reservoirs
- Balancing existing and future water resource needs against GHG injection




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Potential Impacts on Ground Water: An Australian Perspective, 17 April 2009


#### **Methane solubility**



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#### **Groundwater in Australia**


- 5,600 GL/yr used
- Supports 500 cities and townships
- Primarily used for agriculture
- Provinces of overuse



ARNA, 2009

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
#### GAB hydrostratigraphy



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### Geothermal Gradients within the GAB

Gradients Range
 between ~15<sup>o</sup> C/Km to ~
 100<sup>o</sup> C/Km



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
Geochemical response of a potable aquifer to leakage from geologically sequestered carbon dioxide

#### Kris Draude, R. Donahue, R. Chalaturnyk

IEA GHG R&D Network Meeting - Risk Assessment Melbourne, Australia April 16 & 17, 2009




K. Draude, 2004. Geochemical response of a potable aquifer to leakage from geologically sequestered carbon dioxide. **MSc. Thesis, University of Alberta**  0



#### **Environmental Concerns**

- The impact of a sudden release CO2 on public safety is typically of greater concern than the impact on the environment of a slow release.
- Consequences to the environment must be better defined and understood.
- The process of sequestering CO2 must be less damaging to the environment than its continued release to the atmosphere.




#### **Research Objective**

• To characterize the geochemical reactions that may occur in an aquifer as a result of leakage from a CO2 injection well used for the geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide.




#### **Context for Research**




## **CO2** Leakage from Wells in Overlying **Aquifers** K. Draude, 2004. Geochemical response of a potable aquifer to leakage from geologically sequestered carbon dioxide. MSc. Thesis, University of Alberta.

#### Biosphere Lateral Displacement (m) Aquifers Intertill Aquitards **CO**<sub>2</sub> Concentration **Belly River** Intertill **Belly River** (kg/m<sup>3)</sup> Newcastle Upper Geosphe 50 48 Manville 46 44 42 Jurassic Midale Evaporite 40 38 36 34 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 (cap rock) Ratcliffe Newcastle Manville Lower Water Flow Frobisher Not to Scale Alida 18 Well 10 m 16 14 12 Wevburn Reservoir 10 8 6 4 Jurassic Ratcliffe 15 m Co-current Displacement (m)

(from Phase I of IEA GHG Weyburn Project)























#### **Groundwater Chemistry**

<i>routine water properties</i> pH		<u>average</u> 8.07
electrical conductivity	[uS/cm @ 25°C]	3052.5
calcium	[mg/L]	65.96
magnesium	[mg/L]	26.7
sodium	[mg/L]	584.3
potassium	[mg/L]	6.59
chloride	[mg/L]	632.8
carbonate	[mg/L]	<6
bicarbonate	[mg/L]	848.6
T-alkalinity	[mg/L]	696.0
iron	[mg/L]	<0.05
manganese	[mg/L]	0.20
arsenic	[mg/L]	0.0036
strontium	[mg/L]	0.54

#### **Sediment Composition**

extractable elements	<u>concentration</u>
	[µg/g]
calcium	27011
magnesium	7073
iron	8942
aluminum	3650
manganese	231.6
phosphorus	223.7
sulfur	866.1
silicon	215.0

#### **Sediment Composition**


trace metals	<u>concentration</u>	
	[ug/g]	
titanium	130.8	
barium	81.52	
strontium	32.01	
zinc	25.54	
vanadium	14.78	
nickel	10.29	
chromium	7.34	
cobalt	4.90	
copper	4.68	
lead	4.18	
arsenic	3.70	


#### Mineralogy

Fines	Sand	Gravel		
(<75µm)	(<2000µm)	(>2000µn	n)	
Quartz	Quartz	Quartz		
Calcite	Calcite	Calcite		
Dolomite	Dolomite	Dolomite		
Feldspar	K-Feldspar	K-Feldspa	ar	
Smectite	Na-Feldspar	Na-Felds	bar	
Illite		Granite	Mineral	Composition
Kaolinite		Chert		[%]
Chlorite		Coal		<u>[</u> , , , ]
			Smectite	44
			Illite	20
			Kaolinite	19
			Chlorite	17
			Total CEC	38.6 meq/100g

#### Leaching Test


 preliminary test conducted in order to determine the potential for mineral dissolution, ion exchange, and desorption reactions on the sediment phase due to elevated carbon dioxide levels in water.






#### Leaching Test


- Experimental:
  - Experimental variables included time and [H<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub>].
  - Sampling intervals were 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 96 & 128 days.
  - Three concentrations of H<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub> were prepared:
     600, 1200 & 1800 mgCO<sub>2</sub>/L.
  - The bottles were filled with a known mass of sediment and topped up with the desired concentration of H<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub> and left for the time corresponding to the sampling interval.
- Analysis:
  - pH, Electrical Conductivity, Alkalinity, [H<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub>], Ion Chromatography, ICP/MS




#### Leaching Test -pH












#### Leaching Test – Bicarbonate Ion




#### Calcium Concentration (in Solution) during Leaching Test




#### Iron Concentration (in Solution) during Leaching Test





#### **Particle Size Distribution**






#### **Size Fraction Effects**







#### **Column Study**


 generate information on the mineral-watercarbon dioxide interactions under more representative conditions of those found in situ as compared with the leaching study.












#### Siderite Precipitate formed at Column Inlet



#### **Change in Hydraulic Conductivity**



#### **Summary of Results**

- Elevated carbon dioxide levels introduced to the aquifer water resulted in a drop in pH, despite the buffering effects of the carbonate minerals which converted the dissolved carbon dioxide to bicarbonate ions.
- The lowered pH caused other geochemical changes, including the solubilization and precipitation of various mineral phases present in the sediment.
- Elements most affected include calcium, magnesium, nickel, iron, strontium, and barium, all of which underwent a net dissolution, increasing their concentration in the groundwater.
- The elevated bicarbonate levels caused the groundwater to become oversaturated with respect to several carbonate minerals, allowing for precipitation. Most notable of these was the formation of siderite.
- The formation of precipitates reduced the porosity of the sediment, resulting in a decrease in hydraulic conductivity.
- Other metals that were dissolved did not approach the Drinking Water Quality Guidelines outlined by the CCME, for the short-term duration of this experiment.



# Groundwater Quality Changes in Response to CO<sub>2</sub> Leakage from Deep Geological Storage


### Lisa Bacanskas (USEPA) and Jens Birkholzer (LBNL)

With contributions from:

John Apps, Liange Zheng, Nic Spycher, Yingqi Zhang, Tianfu Xu (LBNL) Yousif Kharaka, Jim Thordsen, Evangelos Kakouros (USGS)

## **CO<sub>2</sub> Leakage from Geologic Storage and Possible Impact on Groundwater**






ESD08-002

Main Concern: Increased acidity in response to CO<sub>2</sub> leakage into aquifer may mobilize hazardous trace elements

## **Two Recent or Ongoing Research Projects**





- Project A: Systematic prediction of CO<sub>2</sub>-related mobilization of hazardous trace elements in groundwater using reactive-transport model
- Project B: Field experiment with shallow CO<sub>2</sub> release and measurements of geochemical changes

# Project A: Systematic Quantification of Leakage Impacts



### Part 1: Geochemical Model Development

#### 1a. Literature and Data Survey

• How widely are hazardous trace elements distributed in aquifer rocks? What are the likely mineral hosts for hazardous trace elements?

#### 1b. Evaluation and Thermodynamic Equilibrium Analysis of 38,000 Groundwater Samples from USGS NWIS Database

• What are typical geochemical conditions in U.S. aquifers? What is the initial abundance of hazardous trace elements in most groundwaters? Which minerals control the initial aqueous concentrations of these elements?

### > Part 2: Equilibrium Analysis of Water Quality for High P(CO<sub>2</sub>)

• Which trace element concentrations are most sensitive to CO<sub>2</sub> intrusion?


### > Part 3: Systematic Reactive Transport Model Analysis


- What is the possible impact of CO<sub>2</sub> intrusion on water quality, considering a wide range of hydrogeological and geochemical conditions?
- Will drinking water standards be exceeded, and under which conditions?

As and Pb Distribution in Soils



### **Concentrations in Soils and Surficial Sediments**






# **Example of Thermodynamic Controls in US Aquifers: Lead**





Saturation Index for Galena



- Samples shown were analyzed with ICP-MS (some analytical artifacts)
- Of all ICP-MS samples, about 50-80% had detectable lead concentrations
- Galena (and/or clausthalite) appear to control aqueous lead concentrations in most samples



### Likely Thermodynamic Controls in Reducing Conditions

Hazardous Trace Element	Solid Solution Component	Discrete Mineral
Arsenic (As)	in Pyrite	Arsenopyrite (SS)
Barium (Ba)	_	<u>Barite</u>
Cadmium (Cd)	in Sphalerite	Greenockite (SS), Cadmoselite
Mercury (Hg)	in Pyrite	<u>Cinnabar (SS)</u> , Tiemannite
Lead (Pb)	-	<u>Galena</u> , Clausthalite
Antimony (Sb)	in Pyrite	Gudmundite (SS), Kermesite
Selenium (Se)	in Pyrite	<u>Dzharkenite</u> , Cadmoselite, Tiemannite, Clausthalite,
Uranium (U)	-	<u>Uraninite</u> , Coffinite
Zinc (Zn)	-	<u>Sphalerite</u>


# Part 2: Equilibrium Analysis



### **Aqueous Concentrations at Elevated CO<sub>2</sub> Concentrations**

As Arsenopyrite (SS) 0 Log Concentration (mg/L) -1 MCL -2 -3 **PLM 40** -4 -5 -3 Ó -2 -1 -4 1 Log P (CO<sub>2</sub>) (bar) -1 Cd -2 MCL Log Concentration (mg/L) Greenockite SS -3 PLM 43 & PLM 47 -4 -5 -6 -7 -3 0 -4 -2 -1 Log P (CO<sub>2</sub>) (bar)


(initial pH = 7.6, reducing conditions, calcite saturation)




# **Part 3: Reactive Transport Modeling**




- Simulator TOUGHREACT is used to predict impact of CO<sub>2</sub> intrusion into fresh water aquifer (multiphase flow plus reactive transport)
- > Geochemical model based on groundwater analyses and geochemical evaluation
- Various sensitivity cases





# **Aqueous Arsenic Concentrations**






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## **Project B. Field Experiment at ZERT Shallow Release Facility in Montana**





#### Facility Goals, Rationale, and Design

- Develop a well-characterized site
- Apply known CO<sub>2</sub> injection rates for testing near-surface monitoring
- Use this site to establish detection limits for monitoring technologies
- Use this site to improve flow and transport models
- Develop a site that is accessible and available for multiple seasons / years

#### **Activities to Date**

- 2006—Characterization, vertical-well injections, horizontal well installation
- 2007—Year 1 Shallow-release
  - Ph. 1 100 kg/day for 10 days
  - Ph. 2 300 kg/day for 7 days
- 2008—Year 2 Shallow-release
  - Ph. 1 300 kg/day for 30 days
















**Courtesy of Lee Spangler, MSU** 



12 of 22


Chemical composition of shallow groundwater at ZERT before, during and following 2008 CO<sub>2</sub> injection: Collaborative effort by LBNL and USGS







# **Evolution of pH**





# Water Levels and Fe versus Time






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BERKELEY LAB

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
# **Major Cations vs HCO3**







# **Trace Metals vs HCO3**




**Courtesy of Yousif Kharaka, USGS** 

# Metals vs pH



Short-Term Response Suggest pH Controlled Desorption Below pH of 6.7



- Data analyzed are from early period before first rainfall
- Adsorption reaction with about 0.5 log-slope suggests desorption of bivalent metals
- Same correlation seen for Cadmium and Lead



### Conclusions from Systematic Evaluation

- Many aquifers in the United States and worldwide contain trace amounts of hazardous trace elements that can be mobilized in the case of CO<sub>2</sub> intrusion.
- CO<sub>2</sub>-related mobilization can increase aqueous concentrations of hazardous trace constituents in shallow groundwater resources. However, in reducing environments, drinking water standards should be not be exceeded in most cases. Stronger impact may be seen in oxidizing environments.
- Predictions of water quality changes have wide uncertainty and variability ranges.

### Conclusions from ZERT Experiment

- CO<sub>2</sub> injection caused fast and systematic changes in pH, resulting in strong increases in the concentrations of major cations.
- Increases were also seen in most hazardous trace elements, but drinking water standards were not exceeded (possibly because duration of experiment was too short).
- Desorption/ion exchange are likely processes responsible for observed concentration increases.

## Some Background on Possible Groundwater Quality Impacts



#### > Wang and Jaffe, Energy Conversion and Management, 45, 2004

Simulation of CO<sub>2</sub> intrusion into shallow groundwater shows increase in lead concentrations, for very simplified host rock mineralogies

#### > Kharaka et al., Geology, 34, 2006

- Strong increases in trace metal concentrations following CO<sub>2</sub> injection in a deep storage formation at Frio

#### > Lewicki et al., Environmental Geology, 52, 2007

Natural analogs show acidification of groundwater and changes in chemical composition, but waters remain potable in most cases

#### > McGrath et al., Ground Water Monitoring & Remediation, 27, 2007

 Increase in cadmium concentrations in shallow groundwater (above drinking water limits), related to CO<sub>2</sub> releases from a municipal landfill

#### > Smyth et al., Proceedings GHGT-9, 2008

- Increases in cation concentrations measured in laboratory batch experiments of diverse aquifer rocks exposed to CO<sub>2</sub>-water mix
- Comparison of water samples from aquifers in SACROC region show no trend of degradation below drinking water standards

# CO2CRC The Otway Project


Charles Jenkins, Manager, Monitoring & Verification



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## The Otway storage project












### **CO2CRC Otway Project facilities**



### The conceptual model





- Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
- Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
- Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time."
- Holmes: "That was the curious incident."
- From "Silver Blaze" by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

## 3D surface seismic monitoring (Subsurface)

#### GEOPHYSICS ASSURANCE MONITORING/ STORAGE INTEGRITY MONITORING

*Objective:* to map the migration path of CO2 plume from injector to producer

*Methods:* 4D or time-lapse surveys

Repeatability of surveys before, during and after the CO2 injection is very important for every aspect of acquisition (source and receivers positioning; source signal; hardware; time of year; processing)





## Hydrodynamics & groundwater Monitoring (Near-Surface)

#### GEOCHEMISTRY ASSURANCE MONITORING

#### **Objective**:


Monitor water levels to determine seasonal variation, flow rate and direction
Identify any chemical changes associated with possible CO2 leakage

#### Methods:

- Dataloggers
- Water chemistry

Aquifers monitored:

- Shallow unconfined Port Campbell Limestone,
- Deep confined Dilwyn aquifer



# Soil Gas Monitoring (Surface)

#### GEOCHEMISTRY ASSURANCE SURFACE MONITORING

#### **Objective:**


- Establish CO2 variations within the extended area beyond the CO2CRC tenements
- Determine the likely source of origin
- Differentiate natural from injected CO2.

#### Methods:

The soil gas program extracts air from the unsaturated soil zone above the water table.
Samples are analysed on site (portable gas chromatograph) and in the laboratory for CO2, CH4 and isotopes.

#### Frequency

- Baseline: Four surveys
- Once a year during and after the injection



## **Atmospheric Monitoring**


**Objectives:** 

To verify that injected CO2 stays underground; or in the unlikely event of leakage to surface, demonstrate the capacity to detect and quantify surface leakage





## Atmospheric monitoring



## Downhole fluid sampling






Figure X – U-tube surface facility (yellow container) – above


Figure X – Isotube sample cylinder – left

Figure X – Inside the u -tube surface facility - right






### Injection phase: U-Tube-2 results



#### **Initial Results of U-Tube Sampling**



### What does the "V" in M&V refer to?

#### •Phase 1A

•1. Establish injection and migration models and uncertainties.

#### •Phase 1B

•2. Environmental impacts within SEPP bounds.

•3. Injection/Migration within model prediction bounds.

#### •<u>Phase 2</u>


•4. Verified stable plume within model prediction.

•4a Measurements (logs) show no evidence of injected CO2 beyond secondary containment in Naylor -1 and CRC-1

•4b Air samples collected from existing deepwater wells show no evidence of the injected CO2. There are four such wells that are monitored by DSE and Southern Water.

•4c Air samples collected over a few days in the proximity of the Naylor-1 and CRC-1 wells shows no evidence of the injected CO2.

### Models and Risk



MODELS

### Longer-term "V" questions

- M&V programme developing range of capabilities in the "M"
- What we are trying to "V" is also a research question
- Risks over a range of timescales and sizes
- Health & safety
- Financial accounting the stored CO<sub>2</sub>
- Climate so we make a nett abatement
- Geological do any of the remote risks make sense?
- Probably only the first is well enough posed to design the "M" in a scientific sense, or say how it connects to the risks

### Questions of principle

- What should we measure? What do we want to know?
- How sensitive should our measurements be (signal-tonoise)
- What spatial and temporal coverage do we need (where and when should we look)?
- Can we interpret the measurements we make? How do we extrapolate in time and space?
- Can we invert the measurements we make?
- Because models are missing (outside the reservoir) we are in the exploration/correlation/building up experience phase of enquiry
- Pooling of experience with risks and outcomes is vital.




#### Geostorage Risk Assessment (Shell) Martin Jagger, Alf Garnett, Simon James



#### IEA GHG RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP April 16<sup>th</sup> 2009










#### Background


- EXPERT PANEL DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING OVER 70 SHELL TECHNICAL PROFESSIONALS IN STRUCTURED WORK-SHOPS PRODUCED A DETAILED RISK REGISTER AND DETAILED MITIGATION PLANS
- Developed, Branches For:
  Based on this work a risk assessment tree based on "Italian flag" evidence based risk assessment was developed, branches for:
  - **D** CONTAINMENT
  - **INJECTIVITY**
  - 🗆 CAPACITY
  - □ MONITORING & VERIFICATION

STAKEHOLDERS CAN BE ASSURED THAT A "SPECIFIC CONTAINMENT COMPLEX" WILL ACCEPT AND SAFELY CONTAIN "VOLUME X" IN THE SUBSURFACE FOR ">YYYY YEARS"

#### Generic CO<sub>2</sub> Storage Risk Tree



#### Input : Starts with uncertainty




### Output : Storage Risk Tree

Stakeholders can b	e assured that a specific CD2 containment complex will accept and contain SAFELY all REQUIRED VOLUMES in the subsurface for 200+ years
1 0* TECHN	ICAL RISKS: CD2 storage technical development risks are ALARP
0.5	CONTAINMENT: Injected, reactive fluids will not leak SIGNIFICANTLY from the containment complex
	0.45 m WELLS; will not create SIGNIFICANT leak paths for non-reactive fluids
	ALL LEGACY well locations, depth, current technical status are all known & support non-leakage
	0.55 EEE EXISTENCE: all well locations are known
	0.45 TATUS/CONDITION: status of all known wells is known and supports non-leakage in the subsurface
	ALL T FUTURE well bores will avoid creating leak paths or minimise the risk thereof
	025 FAULTS-FRACTURES; will not create SIGNIFICANT leak paths for non-reactive fluids (consider impact of dynamic pressure changes)
	0.85 m CHARACTERISATION; locations, critical pressures & stresses are known, modelling and choice of well locations and pressures support sealing for reactive flow under injection conditions
	0.55 0.45 CRITICAL PRESSURES & STRESSES; are known and support confidence in calculating maximum allowed induced pressures in the system
	ALL ANY FRACTURE PROPAGATION pressures are measured and modelling and choice of BHP supports containment
	ALL ANY FAULT REACTIVATION pressures are calculated and with choice and control of BHP are supportive of containment
	ALL FAULT VALVING pressures are calculated and with choice and control of BHP are supportive of containment
	0.3 0.45 LOCATIONS of all significant faults & fractures in the containment complex are known and mapped
	0.15 REGIONAL stress measurements are available, are of sufficient quality and are supportive of containment
	0.35 CURRENT DISTRIBUTION OF FLUIDS in the play support fault sealing in the containment complex - including an assessment of natural seismicity
	CAP-ROCKS will not leak SIGNIFICANT volumes of CO2 (consider matrix and existing faults/tractures under non injecting conditions)
	0.45 PROVEN PRIMARY SEAL, the primary seal is proven (in a play sense) to hold pressures & fluids and this proof is representative of the CO2 area
	ANY PROVEN ULTIMATE SEAL: Shallowest seal which defines the upper limit of the container complex.
	ANY NEXCITYE FLORES, Intelaction between reactive induce and caprock are understood and supportive or sustained sealing
	CALCHARL WICH ALL TO V, reactive hous with not night as statistically used of the defined containing complex 0.85 STRUCTURAL DIPS are sufficiently well defined to give confidence in retention through modelling (incl worse case)
	ALL STRUCTURE - RESERVOIR ARCHITECTURE (heterogeneity, compartmentalisation) are sufficiently well defined & margins are enough to give confidence in retention in the complex - through modelling (inc. worse case)
	ALL PLOW STRUCTURE * RESErvoir AnChitectione (needogenergy, comparison) are sumplement an largers are enough to give compare in retenuou in the complex * through modeling (inc. worse case)
0.3 🗖	
1 .0	INJECTIVITY: sufficient injectivity can be achived and maintained.
	INJECTIVITY (FLC 10 years): can be sustained for the full project life cycle
	ALL BINGINEERED (FLC) injectivity can be achieved and sustained
	ALL COMPRESSION (FLC): Can be acheived and sustained
	ALL WELLS (FLC): Can be sited, drilled, completed and stimulated to achieve sufficient injectivity
	ALL NATURE (FLC): Natural factors controlling FLC injectivity are understood and supportive
	ANY 0 Ref (EQ). Reliand foods of stating (ED) injecting as undered and an appendix of the injectivity
	0.2 HETEROGENEITY (FLC): Of the primary reservoir, is sufficiently understood to be confident of maintaining FLC injectivity under reactive flow conditions
E I	- 0.1 Figure 7AR-FIELD AQUIFER (FLC): The aquifer boundary conditions (geography, flow conditions) are sufficiently understood and analysis is supportive of FLC safe injection with no significant impact on BHP or sensitive domains elsewhere.

0.3 NEAR WELL-BORE SCALING & IMPAIRMENT (FLC): Scaling, mineral precipitation and mineral transport are sufficiently understood to support FLC injectivity.

INJECTIVITY (3 yrs): can be achieved and sustained for 3 yrs.

#### **Output : Ratio Plot**



- 1: Stakeholders can be assured that a specific CO2 containment complex will accept and contain SAFELY all REQUIRED VOLU
- 2: EXISTENCE: all well locations are known
- 3: STATUS/CONDITION: status of all known wells is known and supports non-leakage in the subsurface
- 4: FUTURE well bores will avoid creating leak paths or minimise the risk thereof
- 5: FRACTURE PROPAGATION pressures are measured and modelling and choice of BHP supports containment
- 6: FAULT REACTIVATION pressures are calculated and with choice and control of BHP are supportive of containment
- 7: FAULT VALVING pressures are calculated and with choice and control of BHP are supportive of containment
- 8: LOCATIONS of all significant faults & fractures in the containment complex are known and mapped

#### Learnings

- ENSURES THAT RISK ASSESSMENT CONVERSATIONS ACROSS DIFFERENT PROJECTS, AND WITHIN PROJECTS ACROSS DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES, ALL COVER THE SAME GROUND
- □ PROVIDES A COMMON LOGICAL FRAMEWORK THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO ALL STORAGE PROJECTS (BENCHMARKING)
- □ HIGHLIGHTS AREAS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (WHITE SPACE) OR WHERE EVIDENCE IS CONFLICTING AND SO DRIVES APPRAISAL, EXPERIMENTAL & STUDY PLANS
- □ COMPLIMENTS OTHER RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES (E.G. FEP), DOES NOT REPLACE






### Liability Risk Management & Insurance for CCS

Public Good and Private Asset Protection – Balancing Opportunity and Risk in the Face of Global Change

Lindene Patton Chief Climate Product Office Zurich Financial Services



#### THEORY

### <u>Risk Management:</u> Short and Long Term

**Bist manager**hent is predicated on:

- Understanding the process or operation
- Forecasting the range of possible outcomes,
- Determining what influences and drives the outcomes
- Recognizing that forecasts can be wrong,
- Identifying the consequences of being wrong,

Identification of existing tools / models, their applications and limitations is critical

- Limiting the magnitude of the consequence(s) or finding ways to hedge the bet . . . *Mitigation of moral hazard can mean the difference* 

between success and failure

And then,

### Risk Management:


### Short and Long Term Liability

Common Language is essential? Are you sure you


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- Non-performance / default? Underperformance? Defect? Other contractual liability? Tort Liability for Bodily Injury (BI), (first party) Property Damage (PD), Ecological / Natural Resource Damage? Endangered Species Issues?
- <u>Moral Hazard</u> Will the party be better off in the event of loss / failure? Is the party indifferent, and therefore won't try to prevent or mitigate certain losses? Is the party motivated to increase the risk because it bears none of the risk ?
- **FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY** To whom, for what? When?
- **LIABILITY** Statutory? Common law? Civil law jurisdiction?
- **HARM / INJURY** BI or PD or other?
- **DAMAGES** Nature? Type?
- INDEMNITY Contractual? Governmental? First dollar? Excess of retained amount? Insurance? Public / Private?

#### <u>GS Lifecycle:</u> Critical to Risk Management Framework Design




- Industry Sectors Powergen, Energy (oil & gas EOR), Oil Services, Petrochemical, Industrial Gases, Engineering,
- Early movers (pilots) v. commercial-scale deployment
- Existing statutory implications




<sup>©</sup> Zurich

### A Different Risk Profile for CCS Sites



- To estimate the pool of losses, sum the area for every cause of loss and consequence of loss via integral for every site in the pool.
- In other words, make this 3-dimensional, spin it sideways, and consider
- What happens with a FAT TAIL ...



For Discussion Purposes - Fictional Financial Impacts of "Pool" of CCS Sites with Differential Risk Profiles

### Notable US Liability Frameworks:

Each Has Strengths and Weaknesses; Risk Profile is Key

<pre> <u> Public / Private Frameworks&gt; </u></pre>	<a>Compensation (Trust) Funds&gt;</a>
1957   Price-Anderson Nuclear Indemnity	1974   SDWA UIC Program
	1980/1986   CERCLA/SARA Superfund
1968   NFIA Indemnity/Risk Pool	
	1990   TAPAA/OPA OSLTF / TAPLF
2002   SAFETY ACT Risk/Litigation Management	2007   IRGC / IOGCC State Compensation Funds
© Zurich -	Trabucchi and Patton 2008 (BNA WCCR)


### Liability (Risk) Management Options

Trabucchi and Patton 2008 (BNA WCCR)

	GS Project Phases		
Financial Responsibility Mechanisms	Operation (CO <sub>2</sub> Injection)	Closure & Post-Closure	Long-Term Stewardship ( <u>after</u> prescribed post-closure)
<b>Third-Party Instruments</b> (Trust Funds, LOCs, Insurance, Bonds)	>	~	•
<b>Self-Insurance</b> (Financial Test, Corporate Guarantee)	>	~	X
<b>Private/Public Frameworks</b> Trust/Compensation Funds Insurance Models	X	X	✓

### Suggested CCS RM Framework

- <u>Operational Phase</u> Siting, Operation (Compression & Injection), Delimited Closure
  - Single Goal Financial Instruments Surety Bonds, Insurance, Letters of Credit, Self-Insurance (Financial Test, Corporate Guarantee)
  - Cost Estimation Requirements
  - Delimiting Requirements for Issuing Institutions
- Long-Term Stewardship Phase Post-Injection, Post-Site Certification
  - Three-Part Solution Safety Board, CCS Trust, Enabling Legislation



### **CCS Liability Insurance**



CCS Liability policy is a geologic reservoir specific policy comprised of five (5) coverage grants including:

pollution event liability,

- business interruption,
- control of well;

- transmission liability and
- geomechanical liability

## Anticipated damages from CCS operations



- Migration of the gas stream to groundwater, creating carbonic acid upon contact with the water, and potential transmission of soluble minerals and metals in a low level – clean up costs or replacement in kind
- Migration of the gas stream to other mineral stocks subsurface, fouling the private goods – replacement in kind or compensation likely required
- Migration of the gas stream outside the reservoir general trespass and nuisance
- Migration of the gas stream into basements of other low lying areas – damages only long term low level circumstances – like plant death or – in case of huge catastrophic release –asphyxiation
- Migration of the gas stream to the atmosphere, causing liability for carbon credit loss or tax credit loss – limited by business interruption sub limit for first party; excluded for third party
- Damage to well from gas release damages repair to well

### **Geologic Sequestration Financial Assurance (GSFA) Policy**



Reimbursement for task specified in closure / post closure (as applicable) plans as appended to the permit in force at the time of underwriting and as appended to the policy

- No automatic changes to the policy even if permit changes
- No coverage outside the specified tasks in the closure or post closure plans
- No defence coverage

## 3 Key areas of risk transfer covered by GSFA



- Zurich is responsible for the cost differential between the GSFA policy's limit of liability and the underwriting expected cost estimate to complete closure / post closure tasks (risk transfer layer risk).
- Zurich is responsible for increased costs due to acceleration of reservoir closure (accelerated closure risk).
- Inherent financial risk of the percentage rate that the expected reclamation costs are discounted by outpacing the expected rate of return (financial risk).






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Interface between insurance industry and technical risk assessment processes

> Panel Discussion Friday 17<sup>th</sup> April 2009

### CO<sub>2</sub> Sequestration Risk Assessment



- Mostly qualitative and dominated by judgement of expert panel members
- Containment primary focus of risk assessment (political and social risk separate analysis).
- Economic modelling separate from risk analysis
- Risk assessment probabilistic for selected parameters
- Appropriate risk parameters and uncertainties not always well understood
- Strong focus on reservoir flow modelling and case study approach with use of oil and gas analogues

### **Discussion Points**

- 1. What range of CCS risk assessment activities should we adopt (all activities/container focus)?
- 2. Should economics be integrated into risk assessment and, if so, how?
- 3. What risk metrics should be employed?
- 4. How do we value the consequences of a risk event and estimate the uncertainties?

# 1 & 2) What range of CCS risk assessment activities should we adopt?

A full range of CCS activities:

capture, transport, injection and containment

and influences:

economics, politics, policy, public opinion, safety and technical

to ensure that significant risks are not overlooked and to provide guidance to understanding the full consequences of sequestration.

## 3) What risk metrics should be employed?

Need to record potential consequences of sequestration in dollar terms, safety to humans and environmental degradation.

\$ Cost/tonne CO2 avoided and leakage rates at ground surface or into sub-surface resources (e.g., to assess HS & E and ecological risks)


### **Discussion Points**

- 1. What range of CCS risk assessment activities should we adopt (all activities/container focus)?
- 2. Should economics be integrated into risk assessment and, if so, how?
- 3. What risk metrics should be employed?
- 4. How do we value the consequences of a risk event and estimate the uncertainties?

#### 4) How do we value the consequences of a risk event and estimate the uncertainties?

Probability density functions for key parameters, with uncertainties, of important hazardous events that could impact on the successful implementation and completion of a  $CO_2$  storage project

- Iterative process of data gathering, analysis and consultation necessary to minimise uncertainties
- Expert elicitation is unavoidable and should be used as a tool for promoting discussion between experts
- Ability to analyse and compare risks and track all important uncertainties (e.g. logic tree method)
- Use universal risk metrics



## 1-3) What range of CCS risk assessment activities and risk metrics should we adopt?



No international consensus on a single Risk Assessment (RA) methodology.

- Ideas vary in the level of detail applied, the range of activities to be covered
- range from minimal RA with a focus on monitoring to a systems approach where various risks in the CCS system are assessed separately
- Features Events and Processes (FEPs) database often used as a check for, or to build, RA

# CCS Project Risk, Liability & Insurance

# SIMON JAMES MELBOURNE, 17 APRIL 2009



Becoming Decision-driven Why it is hard, why it matters, how it works

□ ALIGNS PROJECT TEAMS IN SUPPORT OF ARTICULATED DECISIONS

**DECISIONS HELP US TO KEEP THE END IN MIND** 


□ DECISIONS ARE DEFINED AS *CHOICES-YET-TO-BE MADE* 

□ DECISIONS HELP US TO CRAFT IMAGINATIVE OPTIONS


□ WE DON'T GET PAID TO MANAGE UNCERTAINTIES, WE GET PAID TO MAKE DECISIONS

UNCERTAINTIES JUST MAKE THE GAME MORE INTERESTING

## **Project Roadmap**



## Project Roadmap



## **RISK ASSESSMENT (TECOP)**

## **D TECHNICAL**

□ ARE TECHNICAL RISK LEVELS ACCEPTABLE?

## **ECONOMIC**

- □ HOW ROBUST IS THE SELECTED CO2 PROJECT OPTION TO TIMING/SHAPE OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AND SENSITIVITIES IN PRICING AND COST PASS-THROUGH?
- □ HOW SECURE IS PROJECT FINANCING (EG SUBSIDIES)?


## **D COMMERCIAL**

- □ WHAT ARE THE KEY PROJECT DRIVERS (REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, REPUTATION)?
- HOW MUCH LIABILITY ARE WE TAKING OD?
- CAD WE STRIKE THE COMMERCIAL DEAL AND PURCHASE THE SERVICES WE **DEED TO PERFORM THE WORK?**
- WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (HC PRODUCTION,
- UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE) ARE AGREED LONG-TERM LIABILITY STRUCTURES & FUNDING MECHANISMS **IN PLACE FOR POST CLOSURE ACTIVITIES?**

## ORGANISATIONAL

- DO RISK ASSESSMENTS INFORM OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPARILITY?
- □ WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OPERATOR ERROR
- WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF OWN ORGANISATION AND CONTRACTORS TO B

#### Proposed New Methodology for CCS in CDM



## Long-Term Liability



- PROPOSED CONCEPT OF "LIABILITY TRANSFER" AND ASSOCIATED FINANCIAL MECHANISMS BASED ON RISK REDUCING OVER TIME
  - HOST COUNTRY TO TAKE ON LONG-TERM LIABILITY AT SOME POINT AFTER PROJECT ACTIVITY ENDS (MUTUALLY AGREED WITH PROJECT PROPONENTS)
- TERMS & CONDITIONS BY WHICH THE HOST COUNTRY TAKES OVER LIABILITY TO BE SPECIFIED PRIOR TO PROJECT REGISTRATION AND INCLUDED IN THE LETTER OF PROJECT APPROVAL BY DESIGNATED NATIONAL AUTHORITY (AND/OR COMPETENT AUTHORITY APPOINTED BY DNA)
- RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING AND LIABILITY FOR REMEDIATION OF SEEPAGE LIES WITH PROJECT PROPONENT PRIOR TO LIABILITY TRANSFER AND WITH THE HOST COUNTRY THEREAFTER

#### **Financial Mechanisms for Liability Costs**



- INSURANCE, BONDS OR ESCROW CAN PROVIDE ASSURANCES FOR LONG-TERM CORRECTIVE MEASURES FOR SEEPAGE POST LIABILITY TRANSFER
- TRANSFERABLE FINANCIAL MECHANISM CAN PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT FUNDS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR SEEPAGE EMISSIONS REMEDIATION/COMPENSATION POST LIABILITY TRANSFER
- PROJECT PROPONENTS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE FINANCIAL SECURITY BEFORE THE PROJECT ACTIVITY COMMENCES
- LEVEL OF FINANCIAL SECURITY AGREED BETWEEN HOST COUNTRY & PROJECT PROPONENTS

**Project Approvals** 



- ALL EXISTING CDM PROJECT APPROVALS APPLY
- THE METHODOLOGY INTRODUCES THE NEED FOR CCS SPECIFIC PLANS/REPORTS TO BE APPROVED:
  - STORAGE COMPLEX CHARACTERISATION REPORT
  - STORAGE COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PLAN
  - SUB-SURFACE MONITORING PLAN
  - PLAN FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF MONITORING/MODELLING
  - PLAN FOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES TO COUNTERACT SIGNIFICANT IRREGULARITIES
- ABOVE PLANS/REPORTS ARE TO BE APPROVED BY HOST COUNTRY DNA (AND/OR COMPETENT AUTHORITY APPOINTED BY DNA), SUBJECT TO REVIEW & COMMENT BY THE CDM EXECUTIVE BOARD AND ITS PANELS.
- ACKNOWLEDGES THE NEED FOR CCS COMPETENCE IN PROJECT APPROVAL FRAMEWORK, POTENTIALLY IN THE FORM OF AN INTERNATIONAL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CENTRE (IPAC) FOR<sub>SLIDE</sub> 9





"It could go badly, or it could go well, depending on whether it goes badly or well."

# **Risk communication and CCS!**

Peta Ashworth Senior Social Scientist 17<sup>th</sup> April, 2009

csiro.au



# **CSIRO Flagship Program**

1	<b>Energy Transformed Flagship</b> Developing clean, affordable energy and transport technologies for a sustainable future.		Preventative Health Flagship Improving the health of Australians through disease prevention and early detection.
Mg	<b>Food Futures Flagship</b> Transforming the agrifood sector through frontier technologies and partnering.		Water for a Healthy Country Flagship Addressing the sustainable management of Australia's water resources.
	Light Metals Flagship Developing new ways to produce light metals, to reduce costs and energy use and improve performance.	2	Wealth from Oceans Flagship Focusing on delivering ocean-based economic, social and environmental wealth to the nation.
	<b><u>Climate Adaptation Flagship</u></b> Finding ways to adapt to the impacts of climate change and variability.		Minerals Down Under Flagship Coordinating minerals research to ensure the competitiveness of Australia's resource base.
	<b>Future Manufacturing Flagship</b> Using nanotechnology to create a new wave of industries and add value to existing		



manufacturing.


#### Acknowledgements

- Sarah Wade, AJW Inc., Washington
- Sallie Greenberg, Illinois State Geological Survey
- Judith Bradbury, Battelle, Pacific NW Lab.
- Jeremy Kranowitz, Keystone Centre
- Daniel Byers, Illinois State Geological Survey
- <u>http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon</u>
   <u>seq/partnerships/partnerships.html</u>



### Outline

- Set the context
- Theories of risk
- International context
- Real objections some examples
- US Carbon Sequestration Regional Partnerships - outreach






## Technology and Risk: It's All Perception



Risk Communication and stakeholder engagement. J. Kranowitz (2007) Keystone Centre







#### Risk versus perception of risk

- A technical definition of risk could be written as: [Probability of a Hazard × Impact of the Hazard Occurring]
- Individuals may have similar reactions or perceptions of risks based on characteristics of the hazards, but any given hazard may engender widely divergent perceptions of risks based on an individual's personal context: their life experience, values and culture. A definition of *perceived* risk has additional factors to the technical definition:

### [Technical Risk × Nature of the Hazard × Context of the Perceiver]

Sadler & Kranowitz, 2005 Keystone Centre



#### CCS Risky Business or Not?

- Stakeholder positions about new ideas and technologies are arrived at through a series of decisions that are made when assessing the risks and benefits of a technology, as well as its moral acceptability.
- Perceptions of risks are heightened when the risk is
  - unknown,
  - catastrophic,
  - felt immediately,
  - uncontrollable, and
  - can harm other people (Slovic, 2000)




#### **Essential elements**

- Any worthwhile risk communication strategy for new perceived high risk technologies should include: (Cormick 2004):
  - mechanisms for building trust
  - understanding stakeholder perceptions
  - moral acceptability to society
  - ensuring benefits outweigh risks.



#### Information and risk perception

#### ""Where you stand depends on where you sit."




#### Who is our audience?

- Different groups can view the same set of issues through different lenses.
- Working with different stakeholders provides different frames of reference and units of analysis to approach the same issues.
- Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, listening to and using the language of different stakeholders allows for different approaches to a similar set of issues, yields higher levels of trust, and creates longer lasting decisions.
  - Influential others
  - Community
  - Education
  - Project specific



# Informed stakeholders personal opinion of CCS (P Radgen et al, 2007)



- 171 scientists and engineering students working in CCS
- •What is your personal opinion of CCS? What do you think general public's opinion is?
- Shows substantial variations between different nations.
- Personal opinion most positive in UK, NO and US.
- Perceived public opinion most positive in FR, NO and UK



#### Preferred energy technology to address global warming

Australia

Solar energy

Wind energy

Energy efficient cars

Carbon sequestration


Bioenergy/biomass

Carbon capture and

storage

Nuclear energy

0%



Probably not use

US

storagestechnologiesnGHGT-8

50%


■ Definitely use ■ Probably use Not sure

75%

D. Reiner et al., (2007)An international comparison of public attitudes towards carbon capture and

25%





### Stated Risks From California EJ Group!

- CO2 liquid's acidic nature is corrosive to the underground environment, contaminating the ground and would eventually leach to the surface.
- When CO2 escapes from underground to the surface it also changes from liquid to gas, it is 1.5 times heavier than air, does not readily disperse in the atmosphere, stays close to the ground and will kill every living human, animal and plant within 20 miles from asphyxiation.
- When CO2 leaches up to the surface it will contaminate underground fresh drinking water aquifers, lakes, rivers and the ocean.
- Southern California is in earthquake country with numerous faults. To sequester the volume of CO2 the distance underground will require large dangerous high pressure equipment.
- The CO2 will **not be transported by pipelines to a safe location** away from the population. The plan is to sequester the CO2 in the Wilmington Oil Field which is located under the City of Los Angeles, City of Long Beach, City of Carson and other neighboring cities.
- Over 500,000 people and children will be placed in danger.



#### And from the 11 year olds' perspective!

#### Dear Mr Bradshaw,


We are two year six students from the International Baccalaureate School, Red Hill Primary. We are currently inquiring into the relationship between population growth and energy use. We are convinced that Geosequestration would provide a solution to carbon dioxide emissions produced from coal energy plants and would like to know more about it.

After viewing an episode of Catalyst on geosequestration, we have recorded your name down as an expert on geosequestration and hope that you will share some information on it with us. If you would be able to help us answer these questions or give us some useful websites to look at we would be very thankful.

- Do you think Geosequestration is a practical and achievable solution towards CO2 emissions from coal energy plants? And why?
- What steps would we, as Australians have to take to ensure the success of geosequestration as a permanent solution?
- Is there another country or city that is already using geosequestration successfully?
- What would it cost to install geosequestration?
- Would it be worth us visiting Geoscience Australia on Hindmarsh Drive to see any other information on this? Or to talk with any other experts?

We thank you in advance for your time and professional opinions.

#### **Our Conceptual Framework**



## Qualitative - Large group process

	Feb, 2008 Youth 29		Mar, 2008 Brisbane 60		Jun, 2008 Melbourne 47		Nov, 2008 Perth 62		Feb, 2009 Adelaide 131	
	Before	After %	Before	After %	Before	After %	Before	After %	Before	After %
	%		%		%		%		%	
Strongly disagree	6.9	3.6	8.6	10.2	2.1	2.1	1.6	4.8	1.5	0
Moderately disagree	13.8	10.7	5.2	1.7	2.1	4.3	4.8	4.8	3.1	2.3
Disagree	0	14.3	6.9	5.1	14.9	4.3	1.6	6.5	5.3	3.8
Unsure	48.3	25	48.3	32.2	59.6	14.9	54.8	21	47.3	9.9
Agree	13.8	35.7	8.6	27.1	6.4	40.4	22.6	37.1	10.7	22.1
Moderately agree	13.8	7.1	17.2	13.6	8.5	19.1	9.7	17.7	13	38.2
Strongly agree	3.4	3.6	5.2	10.2	6.4	12.8	4.8	6.5	17.6	23.7
Missing responses	0	0	0	0	0	2.1	0	1.6	1.5	0
Total	100	100	100	100.1	100	100	99.9	100	100	100

Ashworth et al. (2008) Engaging the public on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Does a large group process work? GHGT9




### **Questions about CCS**

- "Have any studies been done on ways to use CO2 emissions for practical uses thereby creating a recycling effect rather than just bury it?"
- We need to know more about it before widespread application Is it safe? What are the long-term effects? Is it a cover-up operation will it give companies that invest in this technology the appearance of looking green without actually doing anything?
- CCS is not an answer but can be a bridge for other technologies. I thought it was bad but now I have changed my opinion.
- What is payback period for building CO2 sequestration, brings jobs and progress but how many emissions?
- CCS is a pipedream; there is not concrete evidence of it working
- How far down the track is carbon sequestration? How soon can we implement? How long can we use the special sequestration spots?



## **Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships**





## **US Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships**

- Characterisation phase 2003 2005
  - Collect data on CO<sub>2</sub> sources and sinks and develop the human capital to support and enable future carbon sequestration field tests and deployments
- Validation phase 2005 2009
  - Validating the most promising regional opportunities to deploy sequestration technologies
- Development phase 2008 2018
  - Demonstrate at large scale that CO<sub>2</sub> capture, transportation, injection, and storage can be achieved safely, permanently, and economically



#### **RCSP** Outreach Activities

- Research and Coordination:
  - Focus groups and interviews with stakeholders and partners
  - Mediated modeling
  - Outreach Working Group (OWG) calls
- General Outreach:
  - Websites
  - Information materials Atlas, fact sheets, posters, videos, models
  - Briefings civic groups, trade associations, policy makers, ENGOs
  - Media television and print
  - Education curricula for grades K-12
- Project Outreach:
  - Detailed project materials geologic columns, well diagrams, photographs, "Dear Neighbor" packets
  - Targeted communication neighbors, information open houses at the local level



#### RCSP's outreach - challenges

- Lack of attention due to small size and remote location of projects
- Lack of familiarity with the natural carbon cycle, the extent of human GHG emissions, and the mitigation potential of carbon sequestration
- General skepticism towards new technology and some participants in RCSPs
- Ambivalence, based on direct or anecdotal experience, about the value of outreach on the part of some RCSP members
- Lack of scientific knowledge on the part of the audience, combined with the complexity of explaining sequestration
- Previous negative experiences with and distrust in government institutions, including regulatory agencies, to safeguard public welfare

Source: Chapter 6, Best Practices for the Implementation of the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Large-Scale Carbon Sequestration Field Projects



CSIRO Risk Communication and CCS

#### RCSP's outreach - challenges

- Perceived resource competition with renewable energy or energy efficiency
- Lack of full consensus about the role of sequestration by stakeholder groups
- Well publicized CO2 release incidents (e.g. Lake Nyos)
- Resource constraints commensurate with small project size and short duration
- Relationship of the 'messenger' to the project can be important (e.g., public trust is likely to be greater if the messenger is neutral, such as academia)
- Changes in project plans due to permitting or extraneous circumstances

Source: Chapter 6, Best Practices for the Implementation of the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Large-Scale Carbon Sequestration Field Projects



#### RCSP's outreach – lessons learned

- "Develop a **solid understanding** of the stakeholders' concerns and **perceptions** about sequestration and the RCSPs' efforts
- Develop and use materials that address various concerns and make those materials accessible to target audiences
- **Openness and transparency** are essential for gaining broader public "permission" to conduct a research project and are very likely to be important in gaining the same to conduct larger commercial projects.
- Public outreach does not guarantee that everyone will support a sequestration project but it is very important in identifying"


Source: Chapter 6, Best Practices for the Implementation of the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Large-Scale Carbon Sequestration Field Projects

#### Management of the social risk

- But, management of risks is the critical factor for public acceptance
  - How can we have a say in what happens?
  - Will the process be **fair** and will anyone **listen** to us?
  - Can we trust the project developers and government to take care of problems
  - What have our **previous relationships** with these entities shown us?
  - What is the **benefit** to the community
  - How does the project fit or improve our way of life?

Bradbury, J., et al. The Role of Social Factors in Shaping Public Perceptions of CCS: Results of Multi-State Focus Group Interviews in the U.S





#### **Information Materials: Posters, Fact Sheets, Video**



**CSIRO** Risk Communication and CCS

### **Educational Materials**

CSI: Climate Status Inve	estigations							
THROUGH G	OPMENT OF THIS C GENEROUS SUPPOR HE NATIONAL ENER	T FROM THE DE	PARTMENT (	OF ENERGY AN				
	HOME	CURRICULUM GR	RID RESO	URCES	STANDARDS	GLOSSARY		
Welcome to Th middle and hig new ways of t a non-biased to	DAY ONE   DAY TWO   DAY THREE   DAY FOUR   DAY FIVE   DAY SIX   DAY SEVEN   DAY EIGHT   DAY NINE   DAY TEN							
	Curriculum	n Grid						
The Keyston Energy Techn	Use this grid to navigate throughout curriculum by days or discipline.					Standards Key		
and high scho Status Invest	The development of this curriculum and this website was possible because of generous supp <u>ort from the Department of Energy and the</u>					Glossary		
An Interdisciplinary Curriculum Module For Middle School, Grades 5-8 CURRICULUM GRD RESOU GLOSSARY DAY 1 D DAY 5 DAY 6 DAY 1 I DAY 5 DAY 6 DAY 1 I Middle School CSI: Clim Investigations (grades :	National Energy 1	Technolog	HOME	CURRICULUM GR		STANDARDS	GLOSSA	
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		diobat hange Obje	DAY 1 Goal: To understand the definition, types and origins of the major greenhouse gases. Objective: Students will: Create a town with all the elements to sustain human life. Discuss how the activities of the people in the town may create greenhouse gases Make a connection between small unrelated activities and their cumulative affects emissions of greenhouses gases. Materials (For a class of 32): 8 sets of crayons or markers (1 per group) Tape for displaying created towns					

The Keystone Science School Curriculum trains teachers and gives detailed lesson plans and information: http://www.keystonecurriculum.org/



From the PCORP site, several links for educators including The Wisconsin materials http://www.uwsp.edu/cnr/wcee/keep/



### **CCS Models**









CSIRO Risk Communication and CCS

- How can your work help to mitigate the social risk of CCS projects not being accepted?
- How can you work with communications experts so that they can communicate your findings to the relevant stakeholders groups?





#### **Social Research Team**

Peta Ashworth Senior Social Scientist

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# Thank you

#### Contact Us Phone: 1300 363 400 or +61 3 9545 2176 Email: enquiries@csiro.au Web: www.csiro.au



## Demonstrating CO2 Storage in the Otway Basin

Communication and Public Perception Melbourne, April 17, 2009 Sandeep Sharma

26.07.2007

# **Otway Project Teamwork**

Acknowledgements

- CO2CRC Colleagues
  - P.Cool O or or or or or N.K. Himsen, John an Australian Government D.Smit C >- Australian Government Geoscience Australian (Jyr C STRO / O ). Stopper of the coal of the coa
  - Subsu R.Cau THE UNIVERSITY Danc aterson, J.Xu, Y.Cinar J.F.King Danc kare aterson, J.Xu, Y.Cinar J.F.King District Construction Description Descript
  - M&V team. Jennus, A. Henny, J.Undershultz, M.Urosovic, A.Kepic, A.Kepic, P.Wisn MONASH Universityins Solid Energy and Anglo American Difference s
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- CO2CRC P: RESEARCH SCIENCE & - Special TECHNOLOGY
   ACARP Attivities Kest Assestick Program
   ConocoPhillips
   Stanwell Discorporation Limited

Supporting participants: Australian Greenhouse Office | Australian National University | | CANSYD | Meiji University | The Process Group | University of Queensland |LBNL ARC





# Outline

- The Otway Basin Project
  - Project Goals and Concept
  - Key Challenges
- Community consultation
  - Process and activities
- Performance Scorecard
- Lessons Learnt



Confidential



# **CO2CRC Otway Project Goals**


- Contribute towards CO2CRC Vision and Mission.
  - Demonstrate that CCS is technically feasible and environmentally safe.
  - Facilitate research into new monitoring technologies
  - Offer opportunities for trial and experimentation thereby supporting education/training in greenhouse gas technologies.
- Specifically demonstrate to the satisfaction of stakeholders that
  - CO<sub>2</sub> can be **safely produced, transported and injected** into the sub-surface
  - CO<sub>2</sub> can be **safely stored**
  - Subsurface behaviour of the injected CO<sub>2</sub> can be effectively modeled and monitored
  - Storage Volume can be verified as far as possible
  - Build public support for CCS as a mitigation mechanism



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


## **Project Assets and Site**






### **Otway Basin Stratigraphy**





### **Otway Project Concept**





# Key Challenges – each a risk !

#### Regulatory

- No existing regulation for geosequestration.
- Overlaps between jurisdictions
- Access

#### Organisational/Operational

- CRC not an operating entity
- Lack of Operations Systems

#### • Liability Management


 Who would shoulder long term liability.

- Site Characterisation
  - Limited data
- Risk Assessment
- Monitoring
  - Imaging under gas cap
  - Existing wells



- No precedents
- Mixed reports on CCS in the media
- Need for compulsory land

acquisition



# **Community Consultation**

- Formal program to engage with and brief the community early starting Jan 05
  - key landholders
  - Shire and neighbouring councils
  - the local media
- Informing via email and offering briefings to:
  - local State Upper and Lower House MPs
  - NGOs (eg WWF, ACF)
  - State and Federal ministers through their Departments
- Invited Mayor and Planning Manager to CRC technical Symposium
- Formal briefing to shire and public
  - Public info packs distributed to 1200 households
  - Advertisements run in local papers
  - Public meeting with state regulators held on Feb 12,06 others planned
- Social research in community perception





# **Initial Communication – 2005**

#### • The CO2CRC

- CO2CRC is not-for-profit research organisation, funded by government, industry, and research bodies
- The Research Project is important for Victoria, Australia and the World

#### The Potential Project

- Subject to all the necessary planning and environmental approvals
- We will be using safe, proven technology and maintain the highest standards of HSE
- Transparency about the Project at all times
- Community consultation we want to hear what you think and work with you

#### • Why Moyne Shire

- Moyne Shire as a world leader in energy innovation.
- National and international profile for the region
- Help Victoria to decrease it's greenhouse gas emissions
- Economic benefits to Victoria

#### Communication Tools

- Brochures, Videos. Mail drops, Web information





# **Social Research**

#### • Objectives

- Benchmark and track public perceptions of CO2 geo-sequestration
- Identify existing and emerging issues and track these over time
- Provide input to the community consultation plan.

#### • Approach :

- Focus group discussions with people living in country near the site
- Focus group discussions with people living in a close by city.
- In-depth interviews with local landowners.

#### • Initial Results:

- Contrast between above groups: education, knowledge of CCS
- General desire to know more: facts not "spin".
- However, do not want it to be intrusive





# Adapting the Strategy

- Formation of a Stakeholder Reference Group
  - Local Landowners and community representatives
  - Independent chair from DSE
- Fundamental Tenet
  - The community should hear of activities directly from us first
- Address concerns quickly
- Bring scientists to explain their work
- If unable to provide some data explain why
- Quarterly newsletter



# **Example - Informing Anticipated Activities**

- Naylor Phase 1
  - Late March April : Logs to understand reservoir. 2 –3 trucks, a few people for 2 –3 days.
- Naylor Phase 2
  - New well : early 2007
  - Monitoring activity
    - Sampling : 4 –6 months into injection
    - 1 seismic set every 2-3 years (2-3 weeks with a crew of 5-7 people)
    - Well logs 2 –3 times a year (2-3 days each time)

#### Buttress Phase 1


- Late March April : Well Test and Logs : Expected to be a few days
  - Understand well depth : Truck mounted unit with depth gauge
  - Test : Vehicles and storage tanks to flow the well and test gas.

#### • Buttress Phase 2


• Starting late in the year: Site civil works for plant , Plant assembly and testing. Area needed : 1 ha

Plant Operations in 2007-8 for an initial period of up to 2 years





### Production Site: Processing Modules and Compressor Station







# Not all Rosy Media Reports

- Warnambool Standard
- Feb 2007

We will be told by the boffins, in regard to Nirranda, that they have developed better systems.

Gas moves, this fact will never change. It does not come in bricks that can be stacked away for future use.

Gas finds cracks in the rock and rises to the surface.

I urge all residents of Nirranda and surrounding areas to consider the value of your land and water both environmentally and economically and specifically your overseas markets.

Moyne Shire councillors' comments on the proposed development are both ill-informed and a travesty.

One thing you can be sure of is that CO2CRC representative Sandeep Sharma will not be trying to buy land in the area on which to raise his family.

CO2 CRC

Anna Dillon, Rooneys Road, Panmure

# Not all Rosy

# Questions in Parliament

• Feb 2009



It therefore disappoints me that I have to raise this issue on behalf of Peter Parsons, the owner of the property where the plant to trial geosequestration is built. Mr Parsons received a letter from the then Department of Infrastructure, dated 13 July 2007, which says:

On 19 June 2007 the Minister for Planning identified your client's property as 'Special Project Land' for the Otway Basin Carbon Capture and Storage Project, by placing a Gazettal Notice in the *Government Gazette*, No. S 131.

Attached is the Notice of Acquisition, Offer of Compensation and Plans identifying those parts of your client's property the Secretary to the Department of Infrastructure ... has acquired together with other statutory notices and forms setting out what is required under the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act ...

Mr Parsons informs me that he is owed more than \$5000 for the works carried out in connection with this project. Mr Parsons has provided invoices. There is an invoice dated 5 March 2008 for fence repairs after damage done by CO<sub>2</sub> workers for materials and labour for \$1640. Another invoice is for spraying Roundup, for grass seed, power harrowing, and so on, to repair the property after the CO<sub>2</sub> plant was being built and upgraded, for \$2048, in April 2008. There is yet another invoice for \$1328.80 for gravel for south-side gateways that were dug during the laying of pipelines, for gravel and cartage.




### **Operational Challenges**



Access issues: Dairy farms, paddocks, fences





# **CO2CRC Otway Project Score Card**


- 1. Safely produce CO2 from Buttress, transport and inject in Naylor field
- 2. Effectively and safely store and monitor CO2 in the subsurface to satisfaction of stakeholders.
  - Robust Site Characterisation
  - Observations vs Modelling results
- 3. Test/Develop technology and methodologies for monitoring
- 4. Build Community Confidence
- 5. Safely abandon the site and facilities including necessary restoration work.



## **Scorecard 4: Public Acceptance**

#### Public are interested

- What
- Where
- When
- Impacts
  - Noise
  - Traffic
  - Water
  - Dairy Ops
  - Fire
  - General Safety
  - Compensation







### Community Engagement: Site Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

- 10:30 am: Alarm raised man down Call made to Operator by scientist regrading his colleague being unconscious.
- 10:39: Peter Dumesny (Operator) arrives. Confirms that he has informed the ERG. Gives CPR
  - 10:55: The CERT and CFA arrive. The CERT team enters the room and attends to the patient.

11:00: Ambulance arrives and comes in through the site gate. The stretcher is brought down

11:20: Patient moved into ambulance.

• 11:45 : Debriefing





## **Achievements**

#### **Field Performance**

- Strong planning and systems
- Approx. 125,000 manhours without incident
  - CRC-1 and Naylor 1 completion
  - Construction activities
- Approx 47,000 tonnes injected

#### Regulatory

- Complex pathway
- Compliance with Overlapping jurisdictions

#### Community

- Landowner Matters : Compulsory Acquisition
- Seismic Issues
- Overall acceptance

#### Site characterisation

• Further reducing uncertainty

#### **Risk Assessment**

• QRA confirmed confidence in site

#### M&V

- Geophysics, Geochemistry and Atmospheric ongoing
- Observations consistent with models

#### **Financial Management**





# **Lessons Learnt**

- Do not under-estimate Landowner matters
  - This is their livelihood
  - Their decisions will take time
- Start early on Community consultation shire, public meetings etc.
- Involve Govt. representatives in public meetings
  - Clear interfaces with Govt, Public, Media
  - A single Govt focal point is of great help.
- The M&V plan should be built early basis for discussions
  - Explain in simple terms and share information
- There will be difficulties and you cannot please everyone
  - Be consistent, open and transparent
  - Local support is essential





## "What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing" Aristotle


Thank You






## A knowledge continuum

- Warrnambool respondents not aware of the project, however those who partook in the research, whilst not opposed to the project as such, have several concerns they would like addressed
- Nirranda we found much more heterogeneous knowledge bases and opinions




# CRC-1 Injection Site





## Otway helped identify Legislative Complexities



# **Social Research in 2006**


- Overall attitude to the pilot varied
  - Some advocates and others who are opposed
  - Most open to learning more.
- Overall attitude to geosequestration
  - The community in Nirranda, Warrnambool and surrounds are not yet convinced that geosequestration is a viable mitigation option
  - Need more information before they can decide
- Moving forward with community engagement
  - Keen for further community consultation.
  - Community meetings and quarterly newsletters preferred
  - CO2CRC to make information available and transparent to the community
  - Allow the community to initiate engagement rather than being too intrusive.
- Reaction to the communication messages
  - Need to be clear, concise and factual residents do not want to hear 'spin' but facts.





### Risk Assessment for CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin "a double blind approach" + Some News from the Project

Frank.Schilling@kit.edu Hilke.Wuerdemann@GFZ-Potsdam.de und Team





Federal Ministry of Education and Research









# Risk of Personal/Company Interests

## **HSE** Risks

## **Risk for Climate and ETS**

# News from the Project





## **Risk of Personal/Company Interests**

## HSE Risks

## **Risk for Climate and ETS**


# News from the Project





#### In-situ R&D Laboratory for Geological Storage of CO<sub>2</sub> - CO<sub>2</sub>SINK Integrated Project -





# The Risk Assessment Approach

As the risk assessment for CO<sub>2</sub>-storage at Ketzin is mainly based on expert knowledge a **(at least) double blind approach** was favored. as we kept in mind...

- never trust one modeler alone
- that one should never neglect the

"Risk of Personal Interest"

or "Risk of Company Interest"

 A) HSE Risk Assessment for the Ketzin Site
 B) Long Term Risk of Leakage not affecting HSE (but climate and ETS System)



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## III. Independent Approval by Authorities (Mining Authorities, Landratsamt)





## **Involved Authoroties**

- lead: Mining Author according to regul based on Gas Stor (experience from 4
- Mining Authoroties
  - Wasserbehörde (
  - Umweltbehörde
  - Landratsamt (for Police, Fire Fighte
- Requires "Gefahren Abwehrplan"
  - Transport of CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Operations on Site
  - support for required equipmen (gas-measuring devices)

Zeitlicher Ablauf (1)

29.07.2004 Zulassung Seismischer Quellentests

> 31.08.2005 Zulassung Test 3D-Seismik

11.08.2005 Antrag Hauptbetriebsplan "Aufsuchung"

16.12.2005 Hauptbetriebsplan "Bohrarbeiten"

2 Sonderbetriebspla

0 Sonderb (14.03 – 26.09.2007 water)

Zeitlicher Ablauf (2)

02.10.2007 Sonderbetriebsplan "Monitoring"

17.07.2007 Hauptbetriebsplan "Errichtung und Betrieb" (Alarm- und Gefahrenabwehrplan)

ab 21.02.2007 Verschiedene wasserrechtliche Erlaubnisse


Juni 2008 Testphase CO2 Einpressung zur Festlegung der Injektionsparameter

1. Juli 2008 Beginn der regulären CO2 Verpressung





#### atmosphere Risk Analysis Scenarios




K. Zinck-Jørgensen (GEUS) & M. van der Molen (Shell) 2006 Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Risk Assessment CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin – Schilling/Würdemann



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## **Risk Analysis Scenarios**



K. Zinck-Jørgensen (GEUS) & M. van der Molen (Shell) 2006





## For more details – please ask Todd Flach/DNV

# worst case scenarios are the base of this risk assessment

- multi barrier system
- well bore integrity
- natural paths for CO<sub>2</sub>
- old gas storage
- and interrelations between the points mentioned above




## HSE – some examples

- Worst case scenario for Groundwater pollution
- Influence on biosphere (excluding deep biosphere)
  - for dears and rabbits... angle of slope for rain water basin adjusted
  - fence
- Deep biosphere (risk for installations)
  - Monitored
  - N2-Lift
- Workers
- fire fighters on site information, equipment
- children/adults (fence, removal of wheels)
- surveillance (VNG, 24h Security Troop)
- Gefahren- und Abwehrplan (Site, Transport)







# Geological Cross-Section through the subsurface near Ketzin












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# DTS temperature data during cementing of 5-2/1" casing



Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Forschungsuniversität · gegründet 1825 Henninges *et al.* 2007 Risk Assessment CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin – Schilling/Würdemann



## Conclusion

- A at least double blind approach was applied
- Use of "state of the art technology" and a "best practise approach" based on natural gas storage expertise.
- All available data were evaluated and weighted by groups of specialists
  - CO<sub>2</sub> Transport, Storage and Injection
  - Geology
  - Old (Storage) Operation on the Site
  - Drilling/Well Integrity (new and old wells)
  - Integrated Reservoir Models (THMC)
  - Monitoring
    - (update of the models and and risk assessment)
- Approval by mining authorities



#### Public Acceptance: We told the truth and mentioned risks prior to request




### News from the Project







## Coring – Geological Profile









Norden et al. – 2007 Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Forschungsuniversität · gegründet 1825 Risk Assessment CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin – Schilling/Würdemann





### CO<sub>2</sub>SINK in Ketzin








### Removal of iron sulphide – Injectivity increase






#### Fines < 1 mg/L – stop of lifting after production of 100 m<sup>3</sup> water










# Start of injection 30 June 2008 until today: $> 12600 \text{ t of } CO_2$ injected



























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## Gas Membrane Sensor










#### Arrival of CO<sub>2</sub> in OW1 (Ktzi 200): Pressure, Temperature, CO<sub>2</sub> and Kr (Tracer)








## Reservoir simulation – phase 1-

- Phase 1 breakthrough in 200 -
- good matching with the breakthrough on 15.07.2008
- Next step: Phase 2 breakthrough in 202







Amout of CO<sub>2</sub> injected

	Date:	<u>injected CO<sub>2</sub>:</u>
Facility test & preparation	24.06.2008	test amount of CO <sub>2</sub> , Kr-tracer, N <sub>2</sub>
Start of CO <sub>2</sub> injection	30.06.2008	~ 0 t CO <sub>2</sub>
Arrival of CO <sub>2</sub> at OW1 Arrival of CO2 at OW2	15.07.2008 20.03.2009	531,5 t CO <sub>2</sub> ca. 11 000 t CO <sub>2</sub>
Today	16.4.2009	>12 700 t CO <sub>2</sub>




## Seismic monitoring – Baseline VSP – P Velocity






Cosma et al 2009.



Wilt & Alumbaugh, 2006



#### Geoelectrical DC methods for monitoring CO<sub>2</sub>





AGU Fall Meeting, 2008/12/19








#### First results and their analysis

AGU Fall Meeting, 2008/12/19




Schöbel & Kiessling et al.





#### Surface-Downhole Measurements



#### •• dipoles at surface, $r_1 = 800$ m and $r_2 = 1500$ m






### Surface-Downhole Measurements

Fundamentals


#### 2D, dipole-dipole-configuration (CCPP)

#### 2D, Surface-Downhole (CCPP)






#### Surface-Downhole Measurements



#### Surface-Downhole Measurements

#### Conclusion



#### river channel structure and flow direction

Just remember!

General Assembly, 03/2008 B. Norden



Kiessling and the ERT Group Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Risk Assessment CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin – Schilling/Würdemann



#### Thank you for your attention!



Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Forschungsuniversität • gegründet 1825



Risk Assessment CO<sub>2</sub>SINK @ Ketzin – Schilling/Würdemann

IEA-GHG Risk Assessment Network Meeting Melbourne - April 16th-17th, 2009

## Vattenfall Demo Projects in Germany Risk Management Approach

Joint Presentation



### Outline

Background
Risk Management Approach
The Jänschwalde CCS Demo Project
Risk Management Initial Steps



 Vattenfall screen sites in Germany for injection of carbon dioxide produced in their power plants. Presentation focus: Jänschwalde CCS
 Demo project (well suited to become one of the 12 EU Flagship projects)

A robust Risk Management Approach put in place to ensure that the CCS sites are selected and then managed <u>without harm</u> to the population and the environment while <u>insuring the asset integrity</u>

■*DNV* contracted to **initiate the process** of risk assessment for the geological storage

A first Workshop organized in January 2009 involving main industrial/research/academic stakeholders and relevant authorities

Outcomes of the workshop recorded and elaborated for further investigations and actions


### Risk Management Approach


All the threaths and opportunities of the Jänschwalde CCS Demo project are identified, analyzed and managed all along the project life cycle by taking into account the <u>methodologies and practices in</u> <u>development in the CCS community</u>

E.g. The initial context for the preliminary risk assessment of the geological storage was set according to the <u>draft Guideline for Carbon</u> <u>Storage site qualification</u> (under development in the JIP CO2QUALSTORE - leaded by DNV, with Vattenfall and SLB sponsors)

The *Project Team* will integrate the outcome of the preliminary risk assessment for the geological storage with the other elements analyzed/under analysis, such as the pipeline transportation system and the power plant


### Vattenfall CCS Pilot & Demonstration Projects





IEA-GHG RA Network Meeting - Melbourne - April 16th-17th, 2009 Vattenfall, DNV, Schlumberger


### Roadmap to realisation: Project and forecast for scale-up



### **Risk Management - Initial Steps**

The first steps of risk management are usually qualitative / semi-quantitative For the geological storage DNV suggested the use of:

- Structured *What-IF* checklisT(SWIFT) to identify the hazards
- Screening and Ranking Framework (SFR) to assess the containment integrity




\*\*Risk: chance of something happening that will have an impact

### Qualitative Risk Assessment approach

# *Structured What IF checklisT* a group-based approach to identifying hazards.

- <u>Identifies hazards\* and evaluates risks\*\*</u> in a qualitative sense, and recommend appropriate additional safeguards.
- Top-down perspective starting with systems or operations, rather than individual equipment, tasks or failure modes.
- The foundation of a successful SWIFT is a <u>good team</u> that consist of several specialists in different aspects of the subject.
- "What-ifs..?" questions to identify <u>situations or issues or</u> <u>threats</u> with a <u>potential</u> for causing <u>harm</u>.
- To complement issues raised by the group, the SWIFT process may <u>consult FEP</u> (Features, Events and Processes) databases for <u>completeness</u>.



### Rapid Risk Ranking

Level	Level name	Description		Pick cotogorios									
н	High	High risk, not acceptable. Further analysis should be performed to give a better estimate of the risk. Risk reducing measures must be implemented t decrease risk.		Risk categories									
м	High       High risk, not acceptable. Further analysis should be performed to giv better estimate of the risk. Risk reducing measures must be implemented decrease risk.         Medium       The risk may be acceptable but further analysis should be performed decrease the uncertainty in the analysis. Risk reducing measures should be reducing measures should be reducing measures of remarking actions, the number of FEPs of this risk level should be taken into consideration.			Ident	ification	and ass	sessmel	nt of saf	eguards				
				Consequence severity $\rightarrow$									
L	Low	The risk is low and further assessment or risk reducing measures are not necessary				1 VERY LOW	2 LOW	3 MEDIUM	4 HIGH	5 VERY HIGH			
			↑	5	VERY HIGH				MI	eu.			
			2	4	HIGH		_		III	9H			
								MEE	MUH				
					LOW		LOW						
RUE		EVAINILES LOK KALID KISK KANNING	Ъ	1	VERY LOW								

#### s

Consequence severity $\rightarrow$											
		1 VERY LOW	2 LOW	3 MEDIUM	4 HIGH	5 VERY HIGH					
5	VERY HIGH				Ч	сн					
4	HIGH		_								
3	MEDIUM			MED	HUM						
2	LOW		LOW								
1	VERY LOW										

Manag														
Name	Description	Event (E)	Frequency	Process (P)	Probability									
Very Low	Improbable, negligible	Very unlikely to occur during the next 5000 years	About 1 per 10000 years or less	Disregarded	Less or equal 1%	Risk reduction								
Low	Remotely probable, hardly likely		About 1 per 1000 years	Not expected	Less or equal 10%	CONSEQUENCE EXAMPLES FOR RAPID RISK RANKING								
		Likebute essur during	About 1 per 100			No.	Name	Impact on Injectivity	Impact on Capacity	Impact on Storage Integrity	Impact on Local environment	% CO2 leaked after 5000 yrs	Impact on Reputation	Consequence for Permit to operate
Medium	Occasional, likely		years	50/50 chance	Less or equal 50%		1 Very Low reduction. No		Small chance of reduced capacity in			0,0001	Slight or no impact	None
Llink	Probable warry likely	May occur several times	About 1 per 10	Evenented	Less of savel 00%		injection		the future		uunuge			
High		during injection operations	year	·	Less of equal 90%	2	Low	Small reduction,	Minor reduction in capacity, does impact project viability	Unexpected migration of CO2 inside the defined storage complex	Local environmental damage of short duration	0,001	Limited impact	Small fine
Very high	• •	Will occur several times during injection operations	About 1 per year or more.	Sure	Less or equal 99%	2	LOW	injection (hours)						
<b>↑</b>					3	Medium	Significant temporary reduction, interruption to injection for days	Significant reduction in capacity, fixable without new wells	Unexpected migration of CO2 outside the defined storage complex	Time for restitution of ecological resource < 2 years	0,01	Considerable impact	Large fine	
					4	High	Significant permanent reduction, new injectors needed	Significant reduction in capacity, fixable with new wells		resource 2 - 5 years	0,1	National impact	Temporary withdrawal of permit	
Probability and consequence classes					5	Very high	Significant permanent reduction, no fix	Significant reduction in capacity, no fix available	Leakage to vadose zone over large area (>100m2)	of ecological resource such as marine bio-systems,	1	International impact	Permanent loss of permit	
	Low Medium High Very high	Low Remotely probable, hardly likely Medium Occasional, likely High Probable, very likely Very Frequent, to be high expected	Low     Remotely probable, hardly likely     Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       Medium     Occasional, likely     Likely to occur during injection operations       High     Probable, very likely     May occur several times during injection operations       Very     Frequent, to be expected     Will occur several times during injection operations	Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 1000 years         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years         High       Probable, very likely       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year         Very       Frequent, to be expected       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.	Very Low       negligible       the next 5000 years       years or less       Disregarded         Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 1000 years       Not expected         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       50/50 chance         High       Probable, very likely       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year       Expected         Very       Frequent, to be expected       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure	Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 1000 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       50/50 chance       Less or equal 50%         High       Probable, very likely       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year       Expected       Less or equal 90%         Very high       Frequent, to be expected       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure       Less or equal 99%	Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 1000 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%       No.         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       50/50 chance       Less or equal 50%       1         High       Probable, very likely       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year       Expected       Less or equal 90%       2         Very       Frequent, to be expected       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       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Sure       Less or equal 99%       3       Medium         4       High       High </td <td>Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%       CONSEQUENCE E         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       50/50 chance       Less or equal 50%       No.       No.       Name       Impact on Injectivity reduction. No interruption of injection         High       Probable, very likely       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year       Expected       Less or equal 90%       Xmall temporary reduction. No interruption to injection         Very       Frequent, to be expected       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure       Less or equal 99%       2       Low       Significant temporary reduction, interruption to injection for days         4       High       Medium injectors needed       Significant significant</td> <td>Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%       Consequence Examples         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       50/50 chance       Less or equal 50%       No.       Name       Impact on Injectivity       Impact on Capacity reduction. 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Sure       Less or equal 99%       Z       Medium       Significant permanent reduction, no injection for days       Significant significant reduction in capacity, fixable with new wells         Probability and coonsecutions       Significant in capacity, fixable       Significant permanent reduction, no in capacity, fixable       Significant permanent reduction, no in capacity, fixable</td> <td>Very Low       megligible       the next 5000 years       years or less       Disregarded       Less or equal 1%         Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%       CONSEQUENCE EXAMPLES FOR RAPII         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       So/50 chance       Less or equal 50%       No.       Name       Impact on Injectivity       Impact on Capacity       Impact on Storage integrity         High       Probable, very likely high       May occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per 10 year       Expected       Less or equal 90%       Small reduction, minor interruption to incapacity, does inigration of CO2 inside the defined storage complex         Very       Frequent, to be high       Will occur several times during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure       Less or equal 99%       Significant electors needed       Significant in capacity, fixabe without new wells       Unexpected migration of CO2 inside the defined storage complex         Probability       and consecqueence classes       Significant permanent reduction, new in capacity, fixabe       Leskage to vadose cone over small area (&lt;100m2)</td> <td>Very Low       negligible       the next 5000 years       years or less       Disregarded       Less or equal 1%         Low       Remotely probable, hardly likely       Very unlikely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 1000 years       Not expected       Less or equal 10%         Medium       Occasional, likely       Likely to occur during injection operations       About 1 per 100 years       So/50 chance       Less or equal 50%       None       Impact on lightity       Impact on Storage       Impact on Local Integrity       Mone       Minor environment during injection operations       Mout 1 per 10 years       Expected       Less or equal 90%       Z       Low       Small temporary infection float       Small chance of infection float       Minor environmental damage of short during injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure       Less or equal 90%       Z       Low       Small reduction, float       Minor reduction in especity, float       Unexpected migration of CO2 outside the defined storage complex       Local environmental damage of short         Very       Frequent, to be high       Willing injection operations       About 1 per year or more.       Sure       Less or equal 99%       Z       Low       Significant reduction infection float       Minor reduction in capacity, fixable       Cold environmental damage of short         Medium       Medium       Significant reduction, new</td> <td>Integriguine         Internet source years         years of tess         Construction           Low         Remotely probable, hardly likely         Very unlikely to occur during injection operations         About 1 per 100 years         Not expected         Less or equal 10%         Construction in plectivity         Impact on Storage         Impact on Local         % C02 teaked           Medium         Occasional, likely         Likely to occur during injection operations         About 1 per 100 years         50/50 chance         Less or equal 90%         No.         Name         Impact on Storage         Impact on Storage         Impact on Local         % C02 teaked           High         Probable, very likely         May occur several times during injection operations         About 1 per 10 year         Expected         Less or equal 90%         2         Low         Small reduction, inipection (hours)         Unexpected         Local environmental damage of short         0,001           Very         Frequent, to be high         Will occur several times during injection operations         About 1 per year or more.         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IEA-GHG RA Network Meeting - Melbourne - April 16th-17th, 2009 Vattenfall, DNV, Schlumberger

#### PROBABILITY EXAMPLES FOR RAPID RISK RANKING

### Risk Workshop on Geological Storage Sites

#### Risk Workshop – SWIFT Analysis

- 2 potential sites assessed: Birkholz site used as reference and Neutrebbin site compared for differences
- Duration: **2 days**
- Participants: selected experts from main companies and institutions (25 + 5 facilitators)
  - *Competencies*: Regional geology, Drilling and completion, Basin modelling, Wellbore integrity, Stratigraphy, Engineering geology, Geochemistry, Hydrogeology, Geostatistics, Geophysics, Reservoir engineering, Ecology and terrestrial environment, Reservoir modelling, Risk assessment

#### Category Specific Keyword Checklists used in SWIFT Analysis

Hazard category FEP keywords

#### Reservoir

- Spatial domain of interest
- CO2 quantities, injection rate
- Overpressuring
- CO2 composition
- Reversibility
- Remedial actions
- CO2 properties
- CO2 phase behaviour
- CO2 solubility and aqueous speciation
- CO2 interactions
- Displacement of saline formation fluids
- Induced seismicity
- Thermal effects on the injection point
- Heavy metal release
- Mineral dissolution and precipitation
- Reservoir geometry
- Pore architecture
- Heterogeneities
- Stress and mechanical properties

#### Seal

- Effects of pressurisation of reservoir on cap rock
- Drilling activities
- Desiccation of clay
- Additional seals
- Lithology
- Lithification/diagenesis

#### Overburden

- Buoyancy-driven flow
- Co-migration of other gases
- Unconformities
- Heterogeneities
- Undetected features
- Vertical geothermal gradient
- Modified hydrology and hydrogeology
- Microbial processes

#### Vadose zone

- Near-surface aquifers and surface water bodies
- Water management
- Soils and sediments
- Hydrological regime and water balance

#### Surface

- Impacts on humans
- Land and water use
- Buildings
- Terrestrial environment
- Terrestrial ecological systems
- Sinkhole formation
- Diet and food processing
- Community characteristics
- Asphyxiation effects
- Ecotoxicology of contaminants
- Modification of microbiological systems
- Future human actions
- Sea level change
- Periglacial effects
- Subsidence or uplift


#### Wells

- Borehole seals and abandonment
- Drilling and completion
- Formation damage
- Well lining and completion
- Workover
- Monitoring wells
- Well records
- Closure and sealing of boreholes
- Seal failure
- Blowouts
- Soil creep around boreholes

#### Fault zones

- Fractures and faults
- Transmissive faults
- Fault Valving

### Example of log-sheet



### Risk Workshop Follow-up

#### Follow-up 1:Results elaboration to create risk database

Creation of <u>Risk database</u> from the list of Hazards, the Rapid Risk Ranking and the identified Safeguards

#### Follow-up 2: Screening and Ranking Framework

- Questionnaire sent out to individual experts
  - Recording individuals' understanding of containment features: weight property relevance and assign "goodness" and certainty values
- Answers collected and elaborated to derive <u>Integrity</u> <u>Attributes</u>
  - Measuring the degree of consensus amongst individual experts
  - Generating graphical display to present range and spread of assessments and certainties

Characteristics	Attributes	Properties
Potential for	Primary seal	Thickness
primary		Lithology
containment		Demonstrated sealing
		Lateral continuity
	Depth	Distance below surface
	Reservoir	Lithology
		Permeability and porosity
		Thickness
		Fracture or primary porosity
		Pore fluid
		Pressure
		Tectonics
		Hydrology
		Deep wells
		Fault permeability
Potential for	Secondary seal	Thickness
secondary		Lithology
containment		Demonstrated sealing
		Lateral continuity
		Depth
	Shallower seals	Thickness
		Lithology
		Lateral continuity
		Evidence of seepage
Attenuation	Groundwater	Regional flow
Potential	hydrology	Pressure
		Geochemistry
		Salinity
R	ef. C. Oldenb	ura at LBNL

Integration of the outcome of the preliminary risk assessment for the geological storage with the other elements analyzed/under analysis, such as pipeline transportation and power plant to:

- ✓ dig further the potential risks identified;
- ✓ implement preventive and corrective measures to mitigate them; and
- take the risks under control all along the project development.



### **PTRC Weyburn EOR/CCS Project**

### **Risk Assessment Update**

Adrian Bowden – URS Melbourne Donna Pershke – URS Perth

> Melbourne, Australia 17<sup>th</sup> April 2009

## **URS** Business Risk Strategies Outline

Background and approachApplication to PTRC Weyburn project

- Reservoir (Geosphere) risk assessment
- Environmental (Biosphere) risk assessment
- Future stakeholder engagement program

## **URS** Business Risk Strategies Background

- Risk assessment methodology developed as part of Geodisc program of the Petroleum CRC
- APPEA paper (Bowden and Rigg) on assessing risk in storage projects
- Application of methodology with CO2CRC to several storage projects (e.g. Gorgon, Otway Basin PP, Denison Trough, Gippsland Basin, In Salah)
- Apply method to Weyburn EOR Project and expand methodology to include environmental and social risk

## URS Business Risk Strategies Approach

- The approach utilises the RISQUE method (Bowden et al, 2001)
- Risk = Likelihood x Consequence
- Systematic process that uses a formal group of experts to provide judgements on likelihoods and consequences
- Produce outputs that can be used to assist decisions


### **Application to PTRC Weyburn Project**



#### PTRC Weyburn risk assessment objectives

- Apply CO2CRC risk assessment to PTRC Weyburn
- Benchmarking
- Further develop methodology
- Expand the risk assessment from purely technical into the environmental and stakeholder domains
- Provide guidance to future research
- Assist the process of gaining stakeholder support

#### URS Process towards stakeholder acceptance Business Risk Strategies




#### 1. Reservoir (Geosphere) risk assessment

Is the project going to meet CO<sub>2</sub> storage objectives?

- Accept the planned storage volumes? Effectiveness
- Retain 99% of injected CO<sub>2</sub> in geosphere for 1,000 years? -Containment
- What are the risk events that could initiate CO<sub>2</sub> movement from the geosphere?
- What are the key pathways for movement from the geosphere?
- What are the potential rates of CO<sub>2</sub> escape from the geosphere?


#### **Comparison of event containment risk**



#### **Containment risk assessment conclusions**

- The process has identified gaps and uncertainties in information relating to the risks associated with CO<sub>2</sub> release to the biosphere
- The current outputs of the risk model are only a guide to the risk profile of the project
- Outputs useful to direct the focus for future studies
- Need to incorporate the estimates of CO<sub>2</sub> release to the biosphere into an appropriate assessment of the potential environmental impacts on the biosphere

#### URS Process towards stakeholder acceptance Business Risk Strategies




#### 2. Environmental (Biosphere) risk assessment

- Typical EES approach what are the predicted and potential effects on the wider environment
- Which environmental and community assets are valued by the community?
- What are the community concerns?
- Where and how much CO<sub>2</sub> could enter the biosphere?
- What are the highest risk pathways?
- Which assets are at most risk?
- Which Biosphere components are the main contributors to the risk?

#### **Pathways and assets**

**URS** Business Risk Strategies



- Cause and effect process
- Likelihoods for each step
- Consequences Consequences table

		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme	
CONSEQUENCE LEVEL		Minimal, if any impact for some communities. Potentially some impact for a small number (<10) of individuals.	Low level impact for some communities, or high impact for a small number (<10) of individuals.	munities, or high impact communities, or moderate a small number (<10) of impact for communities area-		High level of impact Province wide.	
		0.1	1	10	100	1000	
PROPERTY / INFRASTRUCTURE	Cost to repair, replace, remediate (and lost revenues)	Approximate range from \$0 to \$0.1 million.	Approximate range from \$0.1 to \$1 million.		Approximate range from \$10 to \$100 million.	Approximate range \$100 million to more than \$1 billion.	
ENVIRONMENTAL	Ecosystem Function (need to consider resilience and resistance)	Alteration or disturbance to ecosystem within natural variability. Ecosystem interactions may have changed but it is unlikely that there would be any detectable change outside natural variation / occurrence.	function (no loss of	Measurable changes to the ecosystem components without a major change in function (no loss of components or introduction of new species that affects ecosystem function). Recovery in 1 to 2 years.	Measurable changes to the ecosystem components with a major change in function. Recovery (ie within historic natural variability) in 3 to 10 years.	Long term and possibly irreversible damage to one or more ecosystem function. Recovery, if at all, greater thar 10 years.	
	Habitat, communities and / or assemblages	Alteration or disturbance to habitat within natural variability. Less than 1% of the area of habitat affected or removed.	, ,	5 to 30% of the area of habitat affected in a major way or removed. Re-establishment in 1 to 2 years.	30 to 90% of the area of habitat affected in a major way or removed. Re-establishment in 3 to 10 years.	,	
	Species and / or groups of species (including protected species)		(recruitment, breeding, recovery) or dynamics.		Detectable change to population size and / or behaviour, with an impact on population viability and or dynamics. Recovery (ie within historic natural variability) in 3 to 10 years.	Local extinctions are imminen / immediate or population no longer viable. Recovery, if at all, greater than 10 years.	

**Risk identification** 

#### **Example model inputs**

**URS** Business Risk Strategies


		Likelih				Likelihoo			
		ood				d of			
		over	Affected			having an			Consequ
	Pathway to	1,000	biosphere			impact on	Consequence		ence
Initiating event	biosphere	years	component	Specific asset	Impact on asset	the asset	category	Consequence	level
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Rivers	Souris River	pH change	0.5	Environment	Ecosystem function	1
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Lakes	Permanent lakes	pH change	1	Social	Amenity - recreation	1
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Soils	Soil layer	Soil water pH change	1	Environment	Species	100
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Groundwater	Channel aquifers	Contaminants	0.001	Public health and safe	Illness, injury, fatality	10
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Groundwater	Glacial aquifers	pH change	0.1	Property, infrastructure	Repair, replace	10
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Air	Air quality	Air exclusion	0.01	Public health and safe	Illness, injury, fatality	100
EOR - induced pressure vari	Minor faults	0.0012	Air	Air quality	Contaminants	1	Social	Amenity - sensory, perc	100
EOR - induced pressure vari	Through faults	0.0002	Rivers	Souris River	pH change	1	Environment	Ecosystem function	10
CO2 out-migration	Reservoir flow lines	1E-06	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	10
CO2 out-migration	Reservoir flow lines	1E-06	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Environment	Species	100
CO2 out-migration	Reservoir flow lines	1E-06	Soils	Soil layer	Soil water pH change	0.1	Environment	Species	100
CO2 out-migration	Reservoir flow lines	1E-06	Groundwater	K/T aquifer	pH change	0.0001	Public health and safe	Illness, injury, fatality	10
CO2 out-migration	Reservoir flow lines	1E-06	Groundwater	K/T aquifer	Contaminants	0.01	Social	Amenity - sensory, perc	10
Salt dissolution	Collapse chimneys	2E-05	Rivers	Souris River	pH change	1	Environment	Ecosystem function	100
Salt dissolution	Collapse chimneys	2E-05	Rivers	Souris River	pH change	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	100
Salt dissolution	Collapse chimneys	2E-05	Rivers	Souris River	pH change	1	Social	Amenity - sensory, perc	10
Salt dissolution	Collapse chimneys	2E-05	Lakes	Intermittent lakes	pH change	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	10
Salt dissolution	Collapse chimneys	2E-05	Lakes	Intermittent lakes	pH change	1	Environment	Species	100
Seismic - fault reactivation	Reactivated fractures	0.009	Lakes	Permanent lakes	Free CO2	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	100
Seismic - fault reactivation	Reactivated fractures	0.009	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	100
Seismic - fault reactivation	Reactivated fractures	0.009	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Environment	Species	1000
Seismic - fault reactivation	Reactivated fractures	0.009	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Social	Amenity - recreation	10
Old wells failure	Micro fractures	0.5477	Soils	Soil layer	Soil water pH change	1	Property, infrastructure	Repair, replace	1
Old wells failure	Micro annuli	5.4772	Groundwater	K/T aquifer	pH change	1	Economic	Agriculture	0.1
New wells failure	Micro annuli	0.5477	Air	Air quality	Air exclusion	0.001	Public health and safe	Illness, injury, fatality	100
Well casing corrosion	Well casing	0.1225	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	0.1
Well casing corrosion	Well casing	0.1225	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	0.01	Environment	Species	100
Well casing corrosion	Well casing	0.1225	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	0.01	Social	Amenity - recreation	10
Well casing corrosion	Well casing	0.1225	Soils	Soil layer	Soil air exclusion	0.01	Social	Amenity - sensory, perc	100
Undetected faulty wells	Micro fractures	0.0055	Soils	Soil layer	Soil water pH change	1	Property, infrastructure	Repair, replace	1
Old wells cement	Cement channels	8.6603		Soil layer	Soil water pH change		Property, infrastructure		1
Old wells cement	Cement channels	8.6603	Soils	Soil layer	Soil water pH change		Economic	Agriculture	0.1
Old wells cement	Cement channels	8.6603	Groundwater		pH change		Property, infrastructure	Repair, replace	10
Old wells cement	Cement channels		Groundwater		pH change	1	Environment	Habitat, communities, a	0.1
Old wells cement	Cement channels		Groundwater		pH change	1	Economic	Agriculture	0.1
Old wells outside Wevburn p	Micro annuli	5.4772		Soil laver	Soil water pH change	1	Property, infrastructure	Repair, replace	1

#### **Biosphere risk assessment outputs**

#### Use to:


- Progressively modify project design and research planning
- Reduce overall risk of project
- Communicate risk to wider community
- Demonstrate level of risk to specific assets
- Demonstrate due diligence

#### **Initiating Events - Total Risk**




#### Which assets could be affected?

URS Business Risk Strategies



# **URS** What is the impact on any asset?


#### Estimated frequencies of Moderate and Major consequence levels for environmental assets




# **URS** Business Risk Strategies

#### Which assets are most at risk?

#### Asset Risk Profile and Biosphere Source of risk



#### URS Process towards stakeholder acceptance Business Risk Strategies



# **URS** Business Risk Strategies

### 3. Community outreach program (Future)

- Complete the link between technical issues and community perceptions
- Program to ensure that community perceptions of risk have been properly addressed
- Community education program to provide communities with an understanding of the risks associated with CO2 storage?
- Identify and engage appropriate professional resources

# Stage 2 of the CO2CRC Otway Project: Design of a Single-Well Residual Saturation Test

#### Lincoln Paterson (CO2CRC/CSIRO)

with contributions from Jonathan Ennis-King, Martin Leahy (CO2CRC/CSIRO) Mike Krause (CO2CRC/Stanford University) Yingqi Zhang, Barry Freifeld, Stefan Finsterle (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)



## Outline


- Short review of the CO2CRC Otway Project Stage 1
- Trapping mechanisms: residual trapping
- Objective of the CO2CRC Otway Project Stage 2
- Design options and sensitivity studies








#### Stage 1: Storage in a depleted gas field





# **Stage 1 cumulative injection (tonnes)**



#### **Downhole pressure gauges**



#### Metrolog

#### PRM4-C

#### Pressure and temperature electronic downhole memory gauge Low cost memory gauge huge memory unmatched metrological characteristics \* Used by any technician with no previous knowledge of electronic gauge \* Powered by Smart batteries which remember their use, can be tested for their remaining life and offer up to 12 months of cont \* With innovative features such as: shock absorber mounted electronics metal-to-metal seal for extended test in gas wells Reservoir and well testing Static, flowing and build-up surveys Long duration data recording Production testing and artificial fill control Multi well surveys without reprogramming Specifications detrology Pressure (piezoresistive sensor) Nensor range Accuracy (% of FS) Resolution (psi) Temperature Bange ("F) Accuracy ("F) Accuracy ("F) 0.05 0.02 (0.0015 bars) 0 to 300 0.6 0.01 (-20 to 150 °C) 1 400 000 ry capacity (j Yes Yes (up to 64 intervals) (from 1 x to 18 hrs) (from 0 s to 41 days) (Threshold and trigger any any Yes Pressure start P15 (for up to 13 months recordin rt battery typ staunless 1.25 Material O.D. (inch (31.72 mm) (40 cm) (1.5 kg) (pin up \* box down) (fauch) 15/16" SR 1/4" NPT

31500 Toulouse - France Tel: (33) 5 61 34 80 74 Fax: (33) 5 61 34 80 66


Motrolog 5, Avenue Marcel Dassault E-Mail: mailus@metrolog.com web site: www.metrolog.com








**CRC-1 downhole pressure** 





#### **Buttress wellhead pressure**










#### **Stage 2: Focus on non-structural trapping**






RC

# **Trapping mechanisms (IPCC Special Report)**

- 1. Structural trapping
- 2. Residual trapping
- 3. Solubility trapping
- 4. Mineral trapping






### **Residual capillary trapping**

- CO<sub>2</sub> can be effectively immobilised during CO<sub>2</sub> injection into saline aquifers by residual trapping - also known as capillary trapping - a process resulting from capillary snap-off of isolated CO<sub>2</sub> bubbles.
- The method does not rely on impermeable cap rock to contain the CO<sub>2</sub>, hence reduces risk.
- Usually faster than dissolution or mineral trapping
- Efficient residual trapping in dipping aquifers may allow CO<sub>2</sub> storage where there is not structural closure, providing the migration path is sufficiently long.



## **Residual capillary trapping**



**Figure 1.** Schematic of the trail of residual  $CO_2$  that is left behind because of snap-off as the plume migrates upward during the postinjection period.

From: Juanes, Spiteri, Orr, Blunt; Water Resources Research (2006)



#### Residual oil image from digital core





Image from Mark Knackstedt, ANU





# **Relative permeability**




http://pangea.stanford.edu/research/bensonlab/relperm/index.html





#### **Relative permeability hysteresis**



From: Juanes, Spiteri, Orr, Blunt; Water Resources Research (2006)





## "Huff and puff"

- The huff and puff process is a type of oil well stimulation which involves
  - (i) injecting  $CO_2$  into a well,
  - (ii) shutting in the well to allow the  $CO_2$  to dissipate and dissolve, and
  - (iii) producing the well back.
- This is normally repeated over several cycles and it can lead to increased oil recovery via removal of some productivity damage, reduced oil viscosity, increased dissolved gas content, oil swelling and vaporisation of lighter components of oil. Huff and puff operations can also suppress water production. They can significantly boost short-term oil production.



### **CO2CRC Otway stage 2 objective**

- Objective
  - To determine residual  $CO_2$  saturation at the "field" scale
- Limitations
  - CO<sub>2</sub> capillary trapping needs to be separated from dissolution and migration effects.
  - Heterogeneity may make data analysis uncertain and nonunique, thus the test needs to be robust to heterogeneity.
  - Multiple complementary approaches will improve estimation.







#### **CO2CRC Otway stage 2 design**


- Three complimentary approaches:
  - 1. Fluid cycling  $\rightarrow$  history match pressure and flow rate data
  - 2. Partitioning tracer test  $\rightarrow$  concentration data
  - 3. Repeat borehole logging  $\rightarrow$  thermal and/or other log








#### **Injection design 1 strategy**





#### **Injection design 2 strategy**





#### **Reservoir and fluid definition**

- Parameters used in simulations:
  - Injected gas composition 90% wt CO<sub>2</sub> and 10% wt CH<sub>4</sub>
  - Original and injected brine (where used) salinity of 2000 ppm
  - Pressure: initially at hydrostatic equilibrium at 14.2 MPa
  - Temperature: 63 C
  - Hysteretic relative permeabilities








#### **Reservoir definition**


- Zone 1 consists of a series 10 alternating distinct shale and sand sub-zones.
- Sub-zone 6 from 1487 m to 1495 m is a thick sandstone layer being considered for the test, with shale seals above and below.
  - The shale layers have very low permeability and high entry capillary pressure.
- All of the 8 m thick reservoir layer is perforated in the completion.
- Permeability up to 5 darcy in the layer.















#### Water production fraction - Design 2




CSIRO



#### **Average well pressure - Design 2**



#### CH<sub>4</sub> during production - Design 2



- Methane concentrated due to lower solubility
  - Reasonable sensitivity to  $S_{gr}$ .



### Conclusions

- Huff-push-pull tests can be used to study residual capillary trapping as a dominant trapping mechanism.
- Two injection/production designs have been studied
  - Design 1: Water injection pushes CO<sub>2</sub> only.
  - Design 2: Produce  $CO_2$  and water after injection.
- Design 2 gives history matching that is more robust to heterogeneity.
- Further testing against additional heterogeneity scenarios is currently being undertaken.



## Conclusions

- Three independent measurement approaches to determining residual trapping give increased confidence that the test will work:
  - History match injection and production
  - Tracer partitioning
  - Repeat borehole logging
- If successful, similar small-scale tests could be used at commercial injection sites to reduce uncertainty and risk.





